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 Every 10 years, a grand celebration would be hosted on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square 
to commemorate China’s National Day. Every 10 years, hundreds of thousands of Chinese 
citizens would dress up in fancy attires and march across the Chang’an Avenue to celebrate 
the founding of their country. This is perhaps the single most important and elaborate state 
celebration occasion in China, and it is perhaps the single most high-status state propaganda 
effort that a Chinese leader will host during his tenure. During these National Day Civilian 
Parades, we see images of revolutionary forefathers being surround by oceans of colorful 
confetti-holding young people; in these parades, we see fantastic floats depicting China’s 
most proud achievements since 1949. This is a political occasion that can only occur once 
during a leader’s tenure, and every leader intends to imprint his own legacy upon this parade 
of the decade. In this project, I intend to discover this whole goldmine of political symbolism 
with a practical lens and an eastern perspective. I argue that China’s state propaganda can 
serve the function of signaling policy change. I argue that beyond the stereotypical functions 
of ideological expression and so called ‘brainwashing’, China’s state propaganda can signal 
important policy changes, which includes a change in policy focus, policy direction, as well 
as problem solving strategy. I also argue that amid the current trend of western countries 
using Sinophobia rhetoric to curtail China’s rise, China’s state propaganda machines are 
starting to strategically fight back by showcasing strength during important political 
occasions such as the National Day Civilian Parades. In this thesis, I focus on four case 
studies of four important policy areas that corresponds to the four functions of signaling that I 
am proposing. By looking at the connections between policy changes and parade imagery of 
these policy changes, I establish that the National Day Civilian Parades can indeed reflect the 
ongoing policy changes in the real world to an extent. I hope that by writing this thesis, I can 
demonstrate the political importance of these parades to the academia. Hopefully, we will see 
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 October 1st, 2019.  
 On a bench near the University Hospital, a lonely Chinese student sits quietly in the 
freezing night air while holding a phone in his gloved hands. The Midwestern wind maybe 
cold, but his heart is forever so warm. On that little iPhone screen, tens of thousands of 
people are marching across a wide boulevard cheerfully with wide smiles on their faces. 
While silently tearing up over this homesick inducing-scene, this lonely Chinese student had 









Why study these parades? 
 Since the beginning of China’s Reform Era, the highest authorities of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC)1, the Chinese Military, and the Chinese Government have hosted four 
major celebrations on October 1st to honor China’s National Day. The center of these 
celebrations was a duo-parade display on Tiananmen Square, which included both a military 
parade and a civilian parade. For many years, western media and academia have studied the 
military portion of this duo-parade display to understand the development of China's military 
power and China's position in the geopolitics of East-Asia and the World. It seems that, 
however, the civilian portion of this duo-parade display has not attracted as much attention as 
its military partner. During my research, I have found previous scholarly work on national 
celebrations such as parades for countries such as the Soviet Union, Iraq, Syria, and many 
others; I have also found literature on various other types of state-sponsored performances 
such as TV-shows, films, theater and dance in China; however, what I have not found is 
literature that specifically speaks about these civilian parades. 
           Why should anyone study these parades at all? In my opinion, we need to study these 
parades because of the following reasons.  
The first reason is regarding the frequency and timing of these parades. Between 1949 
and 1970, China hosted this kind of parade once per year. From 1978 until the present, China 
has hosted this kind of parade once every 10 years. Since the beginning of the Reform Era, 
this kind of parade takes place once during a leader's administration, and they tend to take 
place towards halfway of the second term of a leader's reign. Every leader gets only one 
 
1 Please note: you may see many scholars refer to the Communist Party of China (CPC) as the “Chinese 
Communist Party”, or the “CCP”. The usage of “CCP” is common in western academic literature on Chinese 
politics and it is not the official English name that the Communist Party has designated to itself. Since the goal 
of this project is to understand Chinese politics in China’s own terms, I will be using the official English name 
of the Communist Party of China instead of the western given name.  
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parade during his administration, and every leader gets to host a celebration like this after a 
few years on the job. If we look at other forms of state-sponsored political performances in 
China, we do not really see any other equivalents. Every Chinese leader can make plenty of 
soap operas, songs, movies, and propaganda pieces to celebrate their achievements and 
express their hopes for the future; however, every Chinese leader only gets to stand in front 
of Tiananmen square once during their reign to accept the cheers and praises of his people. It 
has been possible for a leader to host multiple military parades during their time in office. 
However, it has yet to be proven possible for a leader, except for Chairman Mao, to have 
more than one civilian parade. The scarcity of this kind of parade means that it is not some 
common propaganda tool that a leader can wield willingly; the scarcity speaks to the crucial 
position and the high political value that these civilian parades hold in Chinese leaders' minds 
after 1978. In addition, given that these parades usually take place during the second term of 
the leader’s administration, it is also reasonable to say that these parades are an important 
opportunity to imprint their own legacy in the history of the PRC. Inside this legacy, leaders 
showcase both their achievements so far as well as their visions for the future. 
The second reason is regarding the special format of these parades. The Chinese 
leadership has a variety of propaganda tools that it can use to pay tribute to the revolutionary 
past, celebrate its current achievements, and express its visions of the future. In China, plenty 
of historical revolutionary TV dramas will be aired every year to pay respect to the armed 
struggles of the Communist Party; plenty of cultural performances such as dances and dramas 
will be planned every year to celebrate and praise the leadership for its achievements at 
present; every year's government work reports, and every party conference's political reports 
will lay out plans for what will be done in the future. None of these cultural or political 
performances, however, match the special format of the civilian parades. The civilian parades 
stand out of China's propaganda norm in that they perform all of the 3 main functions of 
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propaganda in one single setting. Since 1978, the 4 parades that have been hosted so far all 
share a similar structure: the first section of the parades would involve imagery of past 
leaders and past achievements, the middle section of the parades would involve imagery of 
the current leadership and the various achievements of the current leadership, and the final 
section of the parades would involve imagery of hope or visions for the future.  
The third reason is regarding the discrepancy between the popular nature of the 
intended audience of the parades and the elitist nature of the messages being delivered 
through the parades. In the civilian parades, the past, present, and the future are presented 
with songs, dances, waving crowds, colorful floats, and mass choirs. Although there has been 
literature that shows that all political actions can be seen as performances, a civilian parade is 
a type of political action that looks like a regular performance for popular consumption and a 
politicized performance for message delivery.   
In conclusion, I believe the Chinese National Day Civilian Parades would be 
important to study in order to further the understanding of Chinese politics as well as the 
signaling function of state propaganda and political performances. In the Chinese context, the 
National Day Civilian Parades is the only kind of political performance that has all of the 3 
signaling functions of state-sanctioned political performances in one place: it glorifies the 
past, celebrates the present, and envisions the future within a public setting. It is the only 
major political performance that takes place with its scale of operation, popular participation, 
and leadership participation. Due to the fact these parades take place once during a leader’s 
term in office, we can keep track how different policies are being portrayed in this public 
occasion by different leaders.  
Research Question 
 How has the Chinese leadership used the National Day Civilian Parades to signal 
changes in policy focus and policy direction? 
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Outline: 
 In chapter 1, I provide an overview of existing research and literature as well as my 
theoretical framework. I divide my literature review into 3 sections. The first section 
discusses two works on function of state propaganda in China. The second section 
discusses two works on function of state propaganda elsewhere in the world. The third 
section discusses three works on the reason why we see a relatively systematic and stable 
presentation of major policy areas in the parades. The fourth section of chapter 1 details the 
theoretical framework of my project. In chapter 2, I explain my methodology. I divide my 
methodology into three steps: quantitative data collection, qualitative data collection, and 
comparative analysis. In chapter 3, I present the result of my research for each of the 
following policy areas: agriculture, anti-corruption/rule of law, ethnic policy, and response 
to foreign challenges. In chapter 4, I conclude my thesis by summarizing my theory and 











Chapter 1: Existing Research and Theoretical Framework 
 This chapter is divided into 4 sections. In the first section, I look at some existing 
research on functions of state propaganda in China. In the second section, I look at some 
existing research on functions of state propaganda elsewhere in the world. In the third 
section, I establish the first part of my theoretical framework: from what we see in the 
parades, major policy areas are represented more systematically and continuously in the 
parades since the Reform Era. Although policy direction and focus may change to adapt to a 
new situation, the general representation of these policies remain relatively continuous 
throughout the years. I seek to find the reason why representation of major policy areas 
became more stable, systematic, and continuous since the Reform Era. In the fourth section, I 
establish the second part of my theoretical framework: I propose that the National Day 
Civilian Parades in China have four functions: signal a change in policy focus, signal a 
change in problem-solving strategy, signal a change in policy direction, and showcase 
strength for a contentious issue. 
Section 1: Functions of state propaganda in China 
Establish a leader’s image and an ideological stance: 
Some scholars have argued that state propaganda in China is being used by a leader to 
establish his own image in Chinese society as well as to create a more “correct”/ 
“appropriate” version of Chinese history in order to fit into a leader’s agenda. Chen Xiaomi 
argues in her book, Staging Chinese Revolution : Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of 
Propaganda, that films have been being used as a very convenient tool for propaganda 
purposes by the Chinese state to present its new public image when a new leader comes to 
power. She argued that films are frequently used by new leaders to reflect the positive image 
of his new type of leadership and his own new ideology. Chen’s second argument is based on 
the construction of a common national history in China. Chen argued that one of the main 
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factors that allowed for changes in films is the need for the Chinese state to create a “correct” 
and “official” version of history. As time goes on, as leadership changes, and as the political 
situation changes, different leaderships will choose to emphasize different parts of history 
and portray them differently in films to show the version of history that they approve of.2 
In China, state propaganda can be seen in almost every single type of performance art: 
films, dramas, plays, songs, and TV shows. These types of performance arts that have been 
used by the state as carriers of propaganda can be labeled as “main-melody themed” （主旋
律主题）.These “main-melody themed” performance art pieces are meant to educate the 
Chinese public about revolutionary history and political ideology; they are also intended to 
create a sense of sacred responsibility among the audience to “carry on the glorious traditions 
of our revolutionary forefathers” (继承革命先辈的光荣传统).
3
 These “main-melody 
themed” performance art pieces are usually released for public view during important 
political holidays such as the National Day and the Day of the Foundation of the Party.4 In 
some sense, we can see a similarity between these performance art pieces and the National 
Day Civilian Parades. As Chen argued in her book, the reason why these performances are 
labeled as “main-melody themed” is because they are created to express an official 
ideological stance. The “main” in “main melody” represents the communist party. All of 
these political performances are created to express the melody of the communist party to an 
audience of the Chinese public. Just like many of these TV shows, films and dramas that 
would often recreate historical images of leaders like Chairman Mao, all of the National Day 
Civilian Parades have reserved a front roll seat for Chairman Mao’s legacy. The “main-
 
2 Chen, Xiaomi. 2016. “Propaganda Performance, History, and Landscape.” In Staging Chinese Revolution 
Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda. Columbia University Press.  
3 Chen, Xiaomi. 2016. “Propaganda Performance, History, and Landscape.” In Staging Chinese Revolution 
Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda, 20. Columbia University Press.  
4 Chen, Xiaomi. 2016. “Propaganda Performance, History, and Landscape.” In Staging Chinese Revolution 
Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda, 21. Columbia University Press.  
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melody themed” political performances have a function of signaling the official ideological 
position of the Chinese leadership at the time of their creation. The National Day Civilian 
Parades certainly can also be labeled as a “main-melody themed” political performance that 
is created in order to present a congregated display of all the official ideologies of the 
Communist Party of China.  
The National Day Civilian Parades are, however, different from the type of 
performance art that Chen studied in the following manners. Firstly, the role of the state is 
different in the two cases. Although the Chinese state is involved in the creation of both types 
of performances, its role in the films and the dramas is indirect, while its role in the parades is 
direct. In a popular movie or a popular drama portraying the revolutionary era, one does not 
see the contemporary Chinese leadership nor the government; one only sees the portrayal of 
past party leaders that are crafted according to the preferences of the current leadership. In the 
parades, one sees both the ideological image as well as the contemporary leadership. In the 
parades, one sees both of the production of propaganda as well as the creators of propaganda. 
The Chinese state actively participates in the political performance of the parades alongside 
its fellow citizens. 
Secondly, while Chen’s studies focused on the ideological nature of these political 
performances, I focus on the signaling of policy change in political performances. Unlike 
these films and dramas that Chen studied, most of the parades’ time is devoted to presenting 
various policy areas. Instead of being a vessel that just displays revolutionary ideology and 
history, the parades have an important function of displaying policy changes. My work 
essentially would extend the scope of Chen’s analysis of propaganda beyond the analysis of 
how history and leadership images are being portrayed. By looking at the less intensively 
ideological world of policy making, my research would help answer the question: beyond the 
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usual function of ideological expression of state propaganda, what else can state propaganda 
do? 
Similar to Chen, James Farley and Matthew D. Johnson also focused on the function 
of state propaganda as a channel for ideological expression in China. In their book, 
Redefining Propaganda in Modern China: The Mao Era and its Legacies, Farley and 
Johnson explores the legacy of Revolutionary Era state propaganda in Modern China. They 
argue that the CPC uses propaganda as a means of control, a tool to promote inclusion, as 
well as a tool to define and highlight division. The CPC also uses propaganda to promote the 
vision of patriotism and greater national power. For the Communist Party in the modern era, 
state propaganda remains one of the most important ways to establish ideological control so 
that the party can carry out its reform and provide guidance to the people.5 
Another very important function of propaganda in Farley and Johnson’s argument is 
the creation of a favorable historical narrative. The Chinese leadership, especially since Xi 
Jinping took office in 2013, has been increasingly using propaganda to create a narrative for 
the history of the CPC that would both be appealing to a domestic as well as to an 
international audience. China’s state propaganda machine has created a carefully crafted 
narrative for the domestic audience to both reinforce the supremacy of the Party’s position 
and to promote a stronger sense of patriotism. This machine has also created a carefully 
crafted narrative for the international audience to both promote the benefits of China’s model 
of development and to publicize China’s own view of world politics and human history.6 
 
5 Farley, James. 2020. “Introduction.” In Redefining Propaganda in Modern China, the Mao Era and Its 
Legacies, edited by Matthew D. Johnson, 1st ed., 6. Routledge Studies in Modern History . Routledge.  
6 Farley, James. 2020. “Introduction.” In Redefining Propaganda in Modern China, the Mao Era and Its 
Legacies, edited by Matthew D. Johnson, 1st ed., 7–8. Routledge Studies in Modern History . Routledge.  
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Farley and Johnson’s work are very similar to that of Chen in the sense that both of 
their works have focused on the ideological aspect of state propaganda. Both of them, 
however, are missing a piece of the puzzle of the many functions of propaganda. Both of 
them saw contemporary Chinese state propaganda as some sort of a continuation of state 
propaganda in the Revolutionary Era; thus, both of them have highlighted this kind of legacy 
and its influence on how modern Chinese leaders use propaganda. I believe, however, that it 
is important to note the differences between state propaganda in the Revolutionary Era and 
state propaganda in the Reform Era. It is true that the modern Chinese leadership has 
inherited the legacy of Revolutionary Era state propaganda and put this legacy into use for 
their own benefits; however, I would argue that it is also true that the modern Chinese 
leadership made their own inventions that deviated from the Revolutionary legacy to an 
extent. Although state propaganda today in China still maintains a highly ideological nature 
as the previous authors have argued, it is important to note that this is not the only nature of 
state propaganda. My study would move beyond the traditional image of propaganda and the 
legacy-based functions of propaganda. I will not simply view the National Day Civilian 
Parades as just another generic example of state propaganda that continued the legacy of 
Chairman Mao; rather, I will view it as an exceptional form of modern state propaganda that 
includes both an ideological-expression function as well as a policy-change signaling 
function. 
Different functions of state propaganda in different eras 
  Has expression of an ideological stance always been the central function of China’s 
state propaganda work? In Anne-Marie Brady’s book, Marketing Dictatorship : Propaganda 
and Thought Work in Contemporary China, we see that China’s state propaganda has had 
different kinds of functions during different eras since 1978. In the 1980s, reformist leaders 
like Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang downplayed the role of state propaganda as a tool for 
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expression of an ideological stance; rather, they are more focused on economic development 
and reforms than any political campaigns.7  In the early 1980s, China’s state propaganda 
machine was a frequent battleground between conservatives and reformists, and its work 
direction frequently changed depending on the ideological stance of the head of the Central 
Propaganda Department at the time. In 1987, after Zhao Ziyang took office as the General 
Secretary of the CPC, the state propaganda machine gave out a signal that is more tolerating 
of debate and criticism as well as encouraging further economic reform.8 
 Although Brady did not analyze the parades specifically as a case of propaganda in 
her book, we do see a reflection of this general downplay of ideological propaganda work in 
the 1984 parade. Among the 34 formations that were present during the 1984 parade, I find 
that only five of them are strictly about any kind of ideological stance.9 In contrast, I find that 
there are 10 formations that are related to the theme of economic development.10 This 
significant disparity between ideological propaganda work and economic propaganda work is 
in sharp contrast to what we can see in some of the parades during the Cultural Revolution. 
For example, among the 82 formations in the 1969 parade, I find a total of 46 formations that 
are dedicated to some sort of expression of ideological stance.  
 After the Political Turbulence during the Summer of 1989, China’s state propaganda 
saw another major shift in its role and functions. The student protests which resulted in chaos 
and Gorbachev’s political reforms which resulted in the breakup of the USSR both taught the 
 
7 Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. “From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought 
Work in Different Eras.” In Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, 
40. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Accessed March 16, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
8 Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. “From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought 
Work in Different Eras.” In Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, 
40-41. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Accessed March 16, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
9 These five formations are: “First Generation” 第一代领导人, “Goals for Moving-Forward” 前进目标, “Unify 
the Motherland” 统一祖国, “World Peace” 世界和平, and “The Four Upholds” 四个坚持. 
10 These 10 formations are: “Family Responsibility in Production” 联产承包, “Agricultural Reform” 农业改革, 
“Civilized Village” 文明村, “Industrial Modernization” 工业现代化, “Electronics Industry” 电子工业, “Light 
Industries” 轻工业, “Spinning and Weaving” 纺织工业, “Outward Open-Up” 对外开放, “Modernization of 
Science and Technology” 科学技术现代化, and “Happy Resident” 幸福居民. 
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Chinese leadership an important lesson: relaxing control over state propaganda will only lead 
to the end of the regime itself. Jiang Zemin’s administration re-emphasized the importance of 
using propaganda to stabilize society, to maintain the Party’s power, and to create a safe and 
harmonious environment for economic development.11 After 1995, Jiang Zemin’s 
administration took another turn in how they approached propaganda work. In the last few 
years of the 20th century, China faced both threats from the west to try to contain China as 
well as threats from Taiwan in moving towards independence. In this challenging political 
environment, Jiang began to emphasize the idea of national unity, patriotism, as well as 
spiritual civilization. Starting in this time period, China began to try to balance its emphasis 
on the materialistic aspect of economic development versus the importance of spiritual and 
moral social development.12 In the 1999 parade, we see a reflection of this kind of double 
emphasis of both political ideological as well as economic development. In the 1999 parade, 
three formations were used to celebrate the Revolutionary Era as well as the leadership of 
Chairman Mao; in the 1984 parade, there was only one formation that represented this theme. 
The middle section of the 1999 parade, which made up 21 of the 39 formations, mostly 
included China’s achievements in both economic and social development. We can see that 
although economics still maintained a highly important presence with 7 formations, social 
development is being emphasized somewhat slightly more with 12 formations.  
 During the first several years of Hu Jintao’s administration, Brady argues that Hu 
purposefully relaxed restrictions on media and press to a limited extent to try to reduce 
Jiang’s residual influence in the political system. Brady argues that Hu purposefully allowed 
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some level of popular criticism to try to create unfavorable public views of Jiang’s time of 
office in order to create social pressure to force Jiang to give up the remaining military power 
he still held. Soon after Jiang resigned from his last military post in 2004, Hu began to once 
again return to a more standard mode of control over propaganda work.13 It is hard to know if 
it is true that Hu indeed used state propaganda to unseat Jiang, but it is true that as 2009 
arrived, we do see a rather hardline approach of propaganda in the 2009 parade. In the 2009 
parade, the imagery of Chairman Mao and the Revolutionary Era was presented by 5 
formations. Each of the previous leaders’ imagery was presented alongside with a broadcast 
of an audio recording of the leaders’ speeches. 
 It seems that although Brady presented a temporal analysis of state propaganda work 
in China, she once again failed to consider the aspect of policy signaling. She did a very 
thorough job in explaining the reasons behind the different kinds of approach of propaganda 
work during different administrations, but she did not move her analysis further beyond the 
realm of ideological struggle and political in-fighting. In my research, my goal is to move 
away from the usual “social control”, “ideological expression”, and “political struggle” types 
of paradigm in analysis of state propaganda in China. My goal is to try to look at state 
propaganda in China with less of a cynical lens but with more of a practical lens. All of the 
authors that I have mentioned so far have done a very good job at theorizing how China runs 
its propaganda machine, what China does with its propaganda machine, and how has China’s 
propaganda machine changed throughout history. What I wish to explore in this project is to 
narrow down the analysis of state propaganda into a single event that would take place in 
regular intervals in history. In this project, I am not going to treat China as an authoritarian 
state whose political leadership is desperate to try to use propaganda to brainwash its 
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population in order to maintain power for itself; rather, I am going to view China as a modern 
state with a mindful political leadership that is trying to communicate to the public about the 
policy changes and visions via the National Day Civilian Parades, a kind of propaganda tool 
and a kind of political performance whose scale, prestige, and temporal importance are 
unmatched elsewhere. 
Section 2: Functions of state propaganda elsewhere in the World 
Creation and consolidation of a national identity: 
 In the previous section, I discussed that China’s state propaganda can have a goal of 
promoting patriotism and a sense of having a unified national identity. This function of 
propaganda is shared by many other countries in the world, with many employing similar 
kinds of national celebratory events to China. Elie Podeh’s research on national celebrations 
in the Arab Middle East highlighted this precise function. In his book, he argues that in many 
post-colonial states, the newly independent regimes often employed national celebratory 
events such as parades, festivals, and other forms of mass gatherings to create a unified 
identity for the people of their countries.14 He also argues that in many immigrant states such 
as the United States and Australia, national celebrations are often used to create a new 
national identity in a society that is usually diverse in ethnic and cultural make-up.15  
 More specifically, Podeh argues that many countries in the Arab world use national 
celebrations to enforce a sense of national unity in order to create a differentiation between 
“us” and “them”. In the post-colonial sense, “us” usually refers to people in a particular 
country or the Arabic people as a collective nation; “them” usually refers to colonists, 
Europeans, or people from another religion or another Arab country. Because many Arab 
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states share similar languages and religions, it would be difficult for the newly established 
regimes to create a separate national identity for their own people; therefore, national 
celebrations were used as a powerful propaganda tool to not only create and consolidate a 
national identity, but also to maintain a sense of legitimacy for the regime. Podel also argues 
that national celebrations as a propaganda tool can also have an individually emotional effect. 
When a person participates in a parade, a festival, or attend a leader’s rally, that person would 
likely to acquire a sense of being a part of a collective national community as well as being a 
part of the nation’s history. This emotional effect can not only promote an individual’s 
affection towards the regime/the state, but also can help inject the new national identity into 
an individual’s consciousness.16  
 The functions of propaganda that Podeh presented are once again ideological in 
nature. We see that the ideological-expression functions of propaganda are used extensively 
by many countries in the world, regardless of regime type. Specifically, national celebratory 
events as a form of state propaganda are used across the globe to promote a sense of national 
unity and patriotism. I argue that we can see some of this function in-action in China as well. 
Since China is a unified multi-ethnic state, the Chinese leadership has always been trying to 
carefully balance emphasis on individual ethnic identity versus emphasis on a broader sense 
of Chinese national identity. In the analysis section regarding China’s ethnic policy, I will 
demonstrate that through a change of imagery in the National Day Civilian Parades, we can 
see a change of direction of China’s ethnic policy from having more emphasis on individual 
ethnic identity to having more emphasis on a unified Chinese national identity.  
Social Engineering, Social Control, and Outside Image 
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 From what we have seen so far, it seems that state propaganda has been used mostly 
for its ideological expression function by China and many other countries. This, however, is 
only a part of the bigger story of what propaganda can do. From Tricia Starks’ 2009 book, 
The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State, we can see that 
propaganda can also serve as a tool for the USSR to engage in social engineering as well as 
engage in social control. During the early years of the newly born Soviet state, disease and 
lack of hygiene became a major cause in high death rate and poor public health. The new 
Soviet state made solving this health crisis a principal priority in its policy making actions. 
The Soviet state employed its state propaganda machine in creating public health campaigns 
which would send thousands upon thousands of professional and party health workers into 
the general society in order to promote personal hygiene as well as to promote the idea of a 
healthy socialist body.17 In a sense, this public hygiene campaign was used by the early 
Soviet state both as a tool for ideological expression as well as a tool for promoting a certain 
policy to the general population.  
 Starks argues that by employing these public hygiene improvement campaigns, the 
Soviet state was trying to cleanse the entire population out of the “filth” of the old 
feudalism/capitalist Russia. “Filth” here can refer to either the physically poor condition of 
Russian people’s health, or it can refer to the reactionary and outdated institutions of imperial 
Russia. Through a cleanse of “filth”, the Russian people can be reborn into a new type of 
people that are both physically healthy and ideologically healthy. The early Soviet state saw 
this cleanse of public health and hygiene as a way to construct a new socialist identity for its 
population. Having a clean city, a clean house, and a clean body can be powerful evidence of 
the benefits of a new socialist regime in which workers can be taken care of and protected.18   
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 Starks also argues that this hygiene propaganda campaign was intended to create 
effective social control for the new Soviet state. She argues that the creation of the Soviet 
health care system was based on the German economic theory of cameralism. This 
propaganda campaign was an effective way for the Soviet state to surveil its population as 
well as to establish firm hierarchical control over the population. The Soviet state employed 
health inspectors and hygienists to maintain control over the population. Control became a 
central part of this public health campaign, and the Soviet state wanted to use hygiene as an 
opportunity to spread the socialist ideology into individual households on a closely personal 
level. Even though the material condition of the early Soviet state reduced many of these 
hygiene efforts to a more symbolic level, the idea of “being healthy means being 
revolutionary” was deeply imprinted in the consciousness of most Soviet citizens.19 
 Starks presents a very interesting hybrid-nature of state propaganda in this book. The 
Soviet public health campaign was in a way both ideological and practical. It was a 
propaganda campaign that both promoted an ideological expression as well as promoted a 
policy action. It signaled to the population that the Soviet state is committed to improving 
people’s health as well as to cleanse the society of the filth of the old times. Starks’ 
arguments are still mainly focused on the ideological effect of this policy campaign, but she 
is able to move more beyond the simple paradigm of ideological control; she recognizes that 
this campaign produced real but limited actual results.  
 Starks’ idea that state propaganda can be both ideological and practical in nature can 
be seen in the parades. The parades act both as a channel for ideological education as well as 
a signaling device for policy shifts. As the Chinese political system gets more and more 
institutionalized, the parades are becoming more and more systematic in their demonstration 
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of the imagery of both ideological stances as well as the imagery of policy preferences. Each 
generation of leaders are able to showcase their ideological stance as well as their own policy 
preferences in a continuous fashion while paying tribute to their predecessors. Specifically, 
there are certain sections within a parade that are dedicated to express an ideological stance, 
while others are dedicated to signal policy shifts. There are usually formations that directly 
pay tribute to previous leaders and the current leader; these formations are usually placed in 
the forefront of parade, and they are often accompanied by giant slogans showcasing the 
leaders’ ideological stances. The policy area formations are usually present in the second half 
of the parades.  
Section 3: A more stable and systematic representation of policy 
Peaceful succession and institutionalization: 
As we see in the parades, many major policy areas maintain a continuous existence 
throughout the years. Policy areas such as agriculture, industrial development, environmental 
protection, residential living, education, culture, and science are generally always present in 
the parades since the Reform Era. In addition, the way that these major policy areas were 
presented has been largely standardized since the Reform Era, with most of them appearing 
in the parades with their own formation and their own float. This observation leads to a very 
interesting question: why are we seeing this kind of systematic, stabilized, and continuous 
presentation of important policy areas in the parades?  
To answer this question, we can look at the idea of “institutionalization”. In his 2003 
article, China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience, Andrew J. Nathan 
proposes that the CPC’s ability to institutionalize its bureaucratic governance and party 
organization is the reason why the CPC is able to stay in power and maintain a resilient 
authority in a world where many similar regimes had fallen. From the first 2 paragraphs in his 
article, we can see that Nathan believes that authoritarian regimes are naturally fragile 
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because they don’t have proper legitimacy, they rely too much on coercion, they 
overcentralize decision making, and they prioritize a leader’s personal power over 
institutions.20  
  One crucial aspect of the stability of the Chinese political system is regarding the 
leadership succession process. Unlike many other non-western democratic regimes whose 
succession processes are often accompanied by crisis, violence, chaos, or even civil war, 
China’s succession process since Jiang Zemin has been proven to be peaceful and orderly. 
Nathan argues that the institutionalization of the succession process is the key to this rather 
unusual phenomenon.21 Before the Reform Era, although China had a formal set of state 
institutions, these institutions were not used systematically and many of these institutions 
were not fully organized. For example, during the Revolutionary Era, there were no effective 
term limit or retirement age for officials in the category of “Leader of the Party and the State” 
党和国家领导人.Many first-generation leaders such as Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai 
stayed in office until their death; this lifelong service in office was not helpful when it comes 
to picking a successor beforehand: in 1971, one of China’s most famous general, Lin Biao, 
staged a failed coup against Chairman Mao. Even though Deng Xiaoping tried to start the 
process of institutionalization, he was not able to create a safe succession process as the 
Political Turmoil of 1989 forced him to remove his previously chosen successors.22 
   In addition to succession, the institutionalization of China’s political system can also 
be seen in the everyday workings of the government. After 1959, the state governance 
process broke down slowly and eventually became paralyzed during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976). After the 1960s, the Party Congress and the National People’s Congress failed 
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to meet on regular intervals, and many other aspects of China’s government institutions 
stopped functioning normally as years of political struggles heavily hindered the abilities for 
these institutions to do so. Since the Reform Era, however, these government institutions 
began to function normally again. The National People’s Congress would be reelected every 
5 years, and it would congregate once every year for a full plenary session; the Party 
Congress would also be reelected every 5 years, and a new politburo would form accordingly. 
As for the succession process, the institutionalization process can be seen in the following 
instances: first, after Jiang Zemin took office in 1989, none of the more senior party leaders 
ever tried to replace or unseat him even though there had been some conflicts between them. 
Second, Jiang Zemin did not stay in office past the time when he was supposed to retire. 
Third, even though Jiang Zemin preferred his own successor pick, he did not challenge Deng 
Xiaoping’s pick, which was Hu Jintao. Fourth, after 1992, the retired leaders stopped 
intervening in the political decision-making process. Fifth, the Chinese military since 1989 
has not taken a role in the succession process which protected China from the danger of civil 
wars. Sixth, since the selection of a new generation of leaders has to be approved by 
consensus from the previous generation, factional interests are usually restricted and could 
not have any meaningful influences in most cases.23  
 Although this article was written in 2003, the arguments that Nathan presented still 
make sense to this today. After Hu Jintao took office around 2002-2004, he continued this 
institutionalized process and was able to successfully hand over his power to Xi Jinping in 
2012. Nathan’s article provides us with a very important insight into why the Chinese 
political system managed to be stable and organized throughout the years. If we look at the 
National Day Civilian Parades, we can see a very good reflection of this kind of orderly and 
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peaceful transition of power. In every one of these 4 parades that I have studied, all of them 
had sections dedicated to celebrating the legacy of the previous leaders. In Deng’s parade in 
1984, the imageries of Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhu De were presented 
in one of the first formations; in Jiang’s parade in 1999, Chairman Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s 
images were presented in form of a giant portrait for the first time; in Hu’s parade in 2009, 
the portraits of all of his three predecessors were accompanied by the broadcasting of a 
record of an excerpt of their speeches; in Xi’s parade in 2019, each previous leader’s imagery 
was accompanied by a second formation dedicated to celebrate two of his most important 
achievements. We can see from the parades that every Chinese leader maintains a sense of 
respect towards his predecessors in this very important political occasion, indicating a kind of 
orderly inheritance of previous leaders’ ideologies and policies. This is the reason why we 
also see a continuous, stable, and systematic presentation of all the major policies. All the 
major policies are being inherited by the next generation of leaders just like all the 
institutions/powers of the previous generations would always be inherited by the next 
generation of leaders. I argue that although new leaders would reform existing institutions, 
this reform would be more of a “build-upon” kind of process rather than a “destroy and 
rebuild” kind of process.  
Atrophy and Adaptation: 
 In the parades, we can see that the imagery of the different policy areas changes every 
time to reflect the changing policy stances of the Chinese leadership throughout the years. 
One can almost say that from these changing imageries, we can see that the CPC is adapting 
its policy making in some way according to the changing outside circumstances. In David 
Shambaugh’s 2008 book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, he presents 
this precise point with some reservations.  
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 Shambaugh firstly argues that the CPC is in a stage of atrophy. Similar to many 
western scholars, he argues that the CPC has exhibited some symptoms of an atrophying and 
aging Leninist Party similar to that of the Communist Party of the USSR. Second, he argues 
that this atrophying outlook of the CPC is not the full story of China’s current political 
regime.24 He argues that while the CPC has shown some signs of aging and decaying, the 
party itself is also actively adapting to the changing circumstances. In the short run, the CPC 
seems to be able to stabilize its society and maintain its dominance over the political 
landscape by consistently going through a cycle of reform, readjustment, reform, and then 
readjustment.25 Shambaugh argues that due to the fact that the CPC is in an atrophying stage, 
it has to constantly adapt in order to survive as a regime and being flexible would be the key 
to continue its rule. It is crucial for the CPC to be able to address the forever changing 
demands of its population and adapt its policy making accordingly. It is also important for the 
CPC to maintain its governing legitimacy by effectively providing public goods and services 
to its people, which makes adaptation an even more useful tool to use. Shambaugh argues 
that one of the reasons why the Soviet System collapsed was because the aging Soviet 
Communist Party failed to respond to the changing demands of the society. The CPC, having 
learned many valuable lessons from the dissolution of the USSR, managed to position itself 
in a place where it can, within a certain limit, both adapt to the forever changing world while 
maintaining its ideology and control. 26 
 Although neither Shambaugh nor I know if this strategy of consistent adaptation 
would allow the CPC to rule perpetually, both of us would agree that this strategy has indeed 
allowed the CPC to escape the fate of many non-western democratic regimes. In a sense, the 
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CPC has been able to establish a stable and relatively peaceful internal environment for 
development because it is not staying the same. It has managed to achieve a general level of 
political stability by sacrificing some level of policy stability. From the outside world, it may 
seem that China is constantly reforming and reinventing; this is precisely what China is doing 
right. We can see that from actual policy making to policy reflection in the parades, China is 
forever evolving to change its policies in order to effectively respond to the changing 
demands of its population as well the changing world as a whole.  
As I will theorize later, this adaptation strategy can be seen in the four functions of 
signaling of the National Day Civilian Parades. China changes constantly its policy direction, 
policy focus, and problem-solving strategies, and it has managed to change its strategy of 
dealing with foreign threats in recent years. In almost every segment of the parades, we see 
some kind of adaptation to update the imageries of important ideological figures and 
important policy areas. In the 1984 parade, we see that the overwhelming oceans of heavily 
ideological segments have been cut; in their place, we see mainly presentations of economic 
achievements and improvement of people’s daily lives. In the 1999 parade, we see parade 
marchers wearing flashy western styled clothing while giant portraits of leaders march across 
the avenue as highlights of the event. In the 2009 parade, we see more sophisticated-looking 
floats with more formations presenting imageries of policy areas. In the 2019 parade, we see 
an emphasis of each of the previous leaders’ legacy while tens of thousands of young people 
dressed up in freshly designed modern attire march across an avenue that has seen most of 
China’s modern history. I believe that these parades are an excellent reflection of China’s 
strategy of adaptation and constant reforms, and it would be interesting to see how this trend 
adaptation will be reflected in ten years’ time in 2029. 
Cultural Governance: 
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 In Elizabeth Perry’s article, Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘Re-
Orienting’ Party Propaganda, she presents another explanation to the reason why the CPC 
has been able to endure the test of time and to lead a stable and organized regime. She 
proposes that the state propaganda machine in China is crucial in maintaining the communist 
party rule. Perry argues that since the Reform Era, the CPC has been re-orienting its 
propaganda to appeal to a broader audience in the Chinese public. This new orientation 
intends to create a favorable image of the CPC by connecting the Party itself with images of a 
China that is revitalizing. Chinese state propaganda has been trying to create a kind of 
systematic historical narrative for the Party that involves the following principles: first, the 
narrative establishes that China used to be a great nation with a long and proud history. 
Second, it establishes that since 1840, China had been through a harsh decline in its national 
power, and China had endured a tremendous amount of hardship and shame. Third, it 
establishes that amid all of the humiliations and darkness in China, the CPC was born not 
only as a party that strives for communism, but also as a party that strives for the revival of 
the Chinese nation. Fourth, it establishes that the CPC in the modern age is carrying on the 
exact responsibility of reviving the Chinese nation to a new stage of glory that involves an 
inheritance of both of its previous history and culture.27  
 Perry argues subsequently that this cultural and political historical narrative provides 
the CPC with a strong basis of legitimacy. The idea of the CPC being the only party that can 
bring back old glory as well as bring in new glory to the Chinese nation gives the CPC 
legitimacy from a population that is largely proud of their historical past as well as their 
cultural identity. Through various patriotic education programs that broadcast various kinds 
of propaganda to the general public, the CPC is actively creating support within its 
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population by promoting a sense of unity among its people based on the idea of pride of one’s 
own history and one’s own culture.28  
In her article, Perry also highlights an important mechanism in the cultural 
governance strategy. In order to effectively produce propaganda that can produce positive 
public reaction, the state propaganda machine often conducts research on public opinion to 
determine if a certain propaganda idea for a policy/reform would be popular. This research 
can inform the party what would be acceptable and what would not acceptable. Therefore, the 
party can usually create propaganda effectively targeting the right group and change its 
policy to minimize public opposition.29 She argues that based on this mechanism of gathering 
information on public opinion, the CPC has been able to be relatively responsive to its 
population’s concerns by being flexible and adaptive in policy making.30 We can see a 
reflection of this kind of policy flexibility and responsiveness in the National Day Civilian 
Parades. The visual representations of all the major policies are continuously changing 
throughout the years. As we will see in the Agriculture policy section, the presentation of 
agricultural reform/new countryside changes in every parade to reflect the changes made to 
the focuses of China’s agricultural policy. The imageries on these agricultural formations, as 
we shall see, are made to be adaptive to the specific historical circumstance at the time in 
order to present an accurate image of the governments’ positions on agricultural reform. 
These changes in imagery, I argue, serve to create a positive narrative for changes 
made to agricultural policy. The Chinese leadership intends to use these changes in imagery 
to demonstrate the fact that these policies are indeed changing, and that these changes would 
 
28 Perry, Elizabeth J. 2017. “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘Re-Orienting’ Party Propaganda.” 
Chapter. In To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power, edited by Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, 
31-33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
29 Perry, Elizabeth J. 2017. “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘Re-Orienting’ Party Propaganda.” 
Chapter. In To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power, edited by Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, 
29–55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
30 Perry, Elizabeth J. 2017. “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘Re-Orienting’ Party Propaganda.” 
Chapter. In To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power, edited by Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, 
43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 32 
benefit the people. I believe that the National Day Civilian Parades can be considered as an 
important part of the Cultural governance strategy. These parades are used as a signaling tool 
for the CPC to communicate the following message to the people in order for the Party to 
gather popular support: first, the images of previous leaders show that the Party is respectful 
of the Revolutionary past. Second, the heavy display of patriotic symbolism such as flags, 
emblems, and songs create a strong sense of patriotism upon the audience. Third, the forever-
changing presentation of important policy areas indicate to the population that the party cares 
about their concerns and that the party will be responsive and flexible in order to make 
positive changes to the policies. 
Section 4: Theoretical Framework 
 After having understood why these parades present systematic, stable, and continuous 
imageries of major policy areas, the central purpose of my project would be to understand 
how these parades are presenting these purposeful imageries. To answer this question, we 
must first understand what the purpose of these National Day Civilian Parades is. The most 
important piece of literature relating to the study of parades in China is an article written by 
Chang-tai Hung called Mao’s Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s. In this article, 
Hung argues that these kinds of parades in the 1950s are multi-purpose in nature. They can 
signal to the mass populace that the old order has been demolished and a new era has arrived. 
They can serve to legitimize the CPC’s rule. They can be an excellent opportunity for the 
Chinese leadership to showcase their current achievements. They can present Chairman 
Mao’s image as central to China’s revolutionary history. Finally, they can also reinforce 
China’s status in the international communist movement.31  
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 In addition to these general functions, Hung also argues that these parades have a 
timelier adaptiveness in their nature. He finds that in the 1950s, the parades’ themes are often 
direct reflections of the major political campaigns that took place or were taking place at the 
time.32 Regardless of if a campaign is economic in nature (for example, the “Great Leap 
Forward” campaign) or political in nature (for example, the “Resist America and Aid Korea” 
campaign), the parades are usually indicative of what is considered as most important during 
that year. Hung further argues that these parades in the 1950s reflected the political-class 
social structure in China. In most of these parades, the Young Pioneers would usually come 
up first as a representation of the successors to the Socialist Revolution; then the workers 
would march on, symbolizing the leadership-status of the working class. Right after the 
works, the peasants would march on, symbolizing the unity between the two revolutionary 
classes.33 This kind of reflection of political social class status still remains to this day, as the 
imagery of workers and farmers would still come up usually quite forward within a parade.  
 In terms of ethnic policy, Hung notes that the imagery of ethnic groups was present as 
early as the 1950s. Similar to the presentation of ethnic policy in the 1984 parade, the early 
parades showcased ethnic policy by using primarily grouped ethnic dance performances that 
highlighted the individual cultural identities of the ethnic nations. This indicates that even 
though national unity has been a central emphasis of the CPC since the beginning, the 
“laissez-faire” attitude had always been the actual underlying theme of China’s ethnic policy 
from the 1950s to the 2000s.34 As to responding to foreign threats and rivals, although the 
messages of patriotism and anti-imperialism have always existed in some form in the 1950s 
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(2007): 421. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777. 
33 Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." The China Quarterly, no. 190 
(2007): 421-422. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777. 
34 Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." The China Quarterly, no. 190 
(2007): 420. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777. 
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parades, Hung finds that the presentation of negative imageries of OUTSIDE enemies was 
not permitted in the parades.35 He finds that unlike the Soviet tradition of ridiculing enemies 
in the parades, the Chinese leadership refused the usage of direct symbolism to negatively 
portray its enemies; instead, more indirect symbols such as slogans and posters would be 
used to send the message. We can see the reflection of this kind of indirect symbolism in later 
parades as well. In the fourth analysis section, we shall see that even during the most intense 
period of China-US trade war, Xi Jinping did not show around a dummy image of Trump 
during his parade in 2019, which is very different from what the Soviets did to the imagery of 
kulaks: Hung notes that during one parade in the USSR, effigies of the kulaks were burned on 
the Red Square.36 
Hung’s research provides me with a very good basis in understanding the various 
functions and themes of parade politics in China, but I argue that more functions and themes 
have been added to the parades, and some of the functions he presented are no longer in 
effect after the Reform Era, while some of the functions have remained until the modern era.  
 I argue that in contrast to the highly ideological nature of Chairman Mao’s parades, 
parades in the Reform Era are used much more for their signaling function for policy change. 
I also argue that in contrast to the highly turbulent nature of policy making during the 
Revolutionary Era, there is generally much more policy stability after the Reform Era. One 
function of the 1950s parades that is being inherited into the Reform Era would be the 
function of showcasing an administration’s achievements to the public. This function is 
perhaps one of the most obvious and common functions of any kind of state propaganda, 
whether in China or in the west. I argue that within this function of showing off one’s own 
 
35 Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." The China Quarterly, no. 190 
(2007): 428. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777. 
36 Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." The China Quarterly, no. 190 
(2007): 428. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777. 
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achievements, there are four types of more specific signaling effects related to policy change. 
I argue that the parades are not as simple as they appear: they are not just another opportunity 
for the CPC to tell the people how great it is. The CPC is using the parades to signal the 
following:  
The first function of these parades is to signal a change of focus within a policy area 
(we have done enough on this aspect, now let’s focus on this other aspect of the same policy 
area) 政策重点的改变. I will use the example of agricultural policy and its imagery in the 
parades to demonstrate how the CPC signaled a change from focusing on the macro-
economic aspect of agriculture to focusing on the poverty alleviation and the life quality 
aspect of agriculture. 
The second function of these parades is to signal a change of problem-solving strategy 
(we tried to solve this problem this way and it didn’t work out, so let’s now try a new way to 
deal with it) 问题解决方式的转变. I will use the example of anti-corruption/rule of law and 
their imageries in the parades to demonstrate how the CPC signaled a change from a more 
educational/internal-party strategy of combating corruption to a more legalistic/participatory 
strategy of combating corruption. 
The third function of these parades is to signal a change of policy direction (we have 
been doing things a certain way, but now we need to go the opposite direction due to some 
new challenges) 政策方向的转变. I will use the example of ethnic policy and its imagery in 
the parades to demonstrate how the CPC signaled a change from an ethnic policy that 
tolerated more individuality to an ethnic policy that emphasized more unity.  
The fourth function of these parades is to show strength for a contentious issue (we 
are being challenged by an outside source right now, and we need to show that we are 
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powerful as a response right now) 对外展示实力. I will use the issues of Hong Kong and the 
Trade War to demonstrate how the CPC used the parade in 2019 to show China’ strength 
during a time period of contentious diplomatic relations and outside challenges. 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
 The research process of this project can be divided into 3 steps: quantitative data 
collection, qualitative data collection, and comparative analysis of these two types of data. 
Step 1: Quantitative Data Collection: 
 Quantitative data collection involves 4 steps. First, I determined which policy areas 
would be the best fit for each of the first 3 functions of signaling. Second, by doing a brief 
survey of all the 51 government work reports（政府工作报告）and all the 12 party 
congress reports（某届党代会报告/政治报告）, I determined key terms and/or phrases 
that would best represent these 3 policy areas. Third, I conducted a word search for these 
key terms and/or phrases and recorded the frequency of their usage in these reports. Fourth, 
I added all the terms’ frequency of usage together into 3 indices that would represent a 
summarized frequency of mention of these 3 policy areas in the reports. The data sheet is 
organized chronologically and annually from 1954 to 2019. It is important to note that 
from 1961 to 1963, from 1965 to 1974, and from 1976 to 1977, the Chinese government 
did not publish an annual government work report. Data for the party congress reports are 
recorded every 5 years in accordance with the frequency of party congresses, which 
usually convenes quinquennially, with the exception of the 8th, 9th, and 10th party 
congresses.37  
 
37 The 8th Party Congress took place in 1956, the 9th in 1969, and the 10th in 1973.  
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 One important thing to note here is that the process of determining which terms or 
phrases would best describe and represent the policy areas is a very subjective one. For 
agricultural policy, only a handful of terms would be sufficient to accurately reflect its 
level of importance in the reports; for anti-corruption/rule of law and ethnic policy, there 
are more terms that needed to be included in order to accurately reflect their level of 
importance. The principal problem with trying to determine which terms or phrases I 
should include in the calculation of these 3 indices is the fact that different administrations 
would use a different set of terms to describe the same policy area. The biggest problem is 
that as time passes, new terms and phrases would be added to the list of terms and phrases 
as governments enact new policies. New policies might mean new ways to think about a 
certain problem, which means that new terms might be invented in order to describe a new 
concept or a new strategy. As time goes on, the list of terms or phrases to search for would 
grow larger and larger, which is very time consuming.  
In addition, it is hard to collect all the possible terms or phrases that can relate to a 
policy area, as that would require me to go through every report qualitatively and read 
through all the sections relating to that policy area. As I do not have enough time during 
the time limit of a senior thesis project, I have decided to limit the number of terms within 
each index to be under 20. This solution to this unfortunate problem can have some 
negative impact on the quality of the data collected. It is highly likely that most of the 
quantitative trends will be skewed in favor of the older government work reports. Many of 
the newer terms and phrases might be missed in the calculation of the 3 indices, and as a 
result, the relative importance of these 3 policy areas after the 2000s might be 
underestimated to a degree. If I were to be given more time for this research process, I 
would find some automated text analysis software to perform a text analysis by decade 
instead of by each year. As I only established my current research framework a few weeks 
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before the final due date, I did not have time to look for and learn to use an advanced text 
search tool. Another very important issue to be noted here is that frequency of key term 
and phrase usage is only an approximation for the relative importance of these 3 policy 
areas in government and party reports. The frequency of key term and phrase usage is not a 
perfect indication for the actual level of importance of these policy areas in China.  
 One will also note that there is no quantitative data collection with respect to the 
Hong Kong/Trade War policy areas. The primary reason for this unusual exception is a 
constraint of time. As I have revised my research process and structure many times, I did 
not have sufficient of time to collect data on this fourth policy area. Instead, I decided to 
take a fully qualitative approach. As both of these policy areas are highly contemporary 
and have a nature of being on-going current issues, it is reasonable to say that a 
quantitative analysis for these two policy areas would have very skewed trends in favor of 
the present. Since the major Hong Kong protests only started 2 years ago and since the 
Trade War only started 3 years ago, it is reasonable to assume that neither issues will have 
much of a presence in government or party reports before 2018. Even though Hong Kong 
has been under Chinese sovereignty since 1997, I still decided to not collect quantitative 
data related to “One Country, Two System”. This decision was made with respect to the 
“right-now” nature of the 4th type of signaling. In contrary to other 3 policy areas, the 
fourth policy area is much more about the parades as a tool to present a response to an on-
going current issue rather than a tool to signal a change in policy for a continuous and pre-
existing issue.  
Step 2: Qualitative Data Collection: 
 Qualitative data collection consists of 6 categories: formations, notes, function, 
theme, interaction score, and songs. All data for these 6 categories are collected by 
watching video recordings of the four parades and taking notes in the process. Here are 
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some brief descriptions of the 6 categories. More specific coding information can be found 
in the appendix. 
 Formations: I recorded the name of each of the formations in the parades. In the 
1984 and 1999 parades, some formations do not have formal names, so I had to create a 
name for them based on observing and determining the theme of the formation. In the 2009 
and 2019 parades, the CCTV video recordings have subtitles for the formations, so I 
simply took notes on those subtitles. I translated these formation names to my best ability, 
but you may see slightly different translations from other news sources. 
 Visual Representation: I took notes on the appearances of the parades while 
watching the video recordings. This is a very subjective process as I am looking for what is 
considered as interesting to my topic of analysis. I am mainly looking for any new 
innovations in the presentation of images of the 4 policy areas. Many of these notes are 
used in my results and analysis section to help explain the change in appearance of some of 
the formations. 
 Function: the formations can have three main functions. They can either pay tribute 
to China's revolutionary past, celebrate achievements of the current administration, or they 
can provide a vision for the future. Please note that this category is unrelated to the four 
types of signaling. Data from this category adds a temporal dimension to the analysis of the 
contents of the formations. This category can be useful for future research in terms of 
analyzing, for example, the presence of the legacy of Chairman Mao in these parades.  
 Theme: the theme of the formations refers to the general policy area or the social 
class/population group that the formations intend to represent. The theme of a formation is 
determined subjectively by both looking at the name of the formations and the physical 
appearance of the formations.  
 40 
 Interaction score: the interaction score of each formation is a quantitative 
measurement for the level of interaction between the marching crowds and the viewing 
leadership. This score is determined subjectively by watching the video recordings of each 
parade and observing to see if the marching crowds had any direct interaction such as eye 
contact or hand waving with the leadership.  
 Songs: every formation in every parade is accompanied by one or a set of 
background music. These songs are usually chosen to match the general theme of a 
segment, a section, or a particular formation. The songs that are being used in the parades 
are usually very well-known and popular music scores in China, meaning they can be 
determined easily by simply listening to them and then taking notes on their names. 
Step 3: Comparative Analysis: 
 The comparative analysis of quantitative and qualitative data involves both 
descriptive statistics and qualitative comparison. For the first three types of signaling, there 
are three analysis sections: qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis of government work 
reports, and quantitative analysis of party Congress reports.  
 In the qualitative analysis sections, I describe each of the policy areas’ presence in 
the parades chronologically. For the agricultural policy and ethnic policy sections, I made a 
detailed account of the presence of agricultural and ethnic policy formations in each of the 
four parades and provided my own analysis on the significance of change in float imagery 
and are the policy implications of these changes. For the anti-corruption/rule of law 
section, I made a detailed account of the presence of this policy area in the 2009 and 2019 
parades. For the 1984 and 1999 parades, I explained why this policy area was not present. 
For the Hong Kong/Trade War section, I made a detailed account of the presence of the 
relevant formations in 2019. For the previous 3 parades, I explained why this policy area 
was not present. 
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 In the quantitative analysis of the government work reports section, I presented a 
graph of the frequency of term usage for 3 or 4 most important terms related to the first 3 
policy areas. I then took notes on the various important trends seen in the graphs and then 
compared these trends with what we saw in the parades. I compared the trends with the 
parade imagery and focused on which parts matched together and which parts did not 
match together. For those parts that matched together, I explained how exactly the two are 
related by using qualitative evidence such as which specific policies were enacted in these 
policy areas during a specific time period. For those parts that did not match together, I 
explained why they might not have matched together, and I explained the historical 
background of these policy areas to see why there are discrepancies. 
 In the quantitative analysis of the party congress reports section, I performed a 
similar mode of descriptive statistics of the frequency of term usage in the party congress 
reports with comparisons made with the qualitative descriptions of the parades. I then 
made a comparison between the trends we see in the government work reports and the 
trends we see in the party congress reports. I explained why these trends have or have not 











Parade Terminology and Parade Structure 
This section is created with the purpose of introducing some of the important terms 





















is the most basic unit in a 
parade. Its participants are 
usually organized in a 
rectangular shape while 
marching. Each formation 
would usually represent a 
certain theme or policy.  
 
At the center of a formation, 
there is usually a float（花
车）. A float is a moving piece 
of display, usually constructed 
with a mobile unit on the 
bottom and colorful models of 
theme-related imageries on the 
top. 
 
In a formation 
dedicated to the image 
of a certain leader, 
there will usually be a 
giant slogan （标语）
on showcase right after 
the central float. 
Slogans are usually 
used to signify a 
principle stance of the 
CPC in related to that 
leader. 
 
The main part of the formation 
is filled with crowds of people 
marching in unison. These 
people are usually called 
“Marching Masses”（游行群
众）. They are usually dressed 
in matching uniforms 
complimentary to the central 
float. 
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Chapter 3: Results and Analysis (Descriptive Statistics) 
Civilized Village and Agricultural Reforms: 
The first type of the parades’ signaling functions involves the presentation of the 
change of focus within a policy area. For thousands of years, agriculture has been the most 
important and the most difficult policy for any Chinese leader to manage. Being able to 
feed one’s population had become a staple achievement that any benevolent kings or 
emperors would wish to have as a part of their legacy. The first major piece of economic 
reform that the newly born PRC enacted was the famous Land Reform Law of 1952; after 
1978, agriculture once again became the vanguard policy area for economic reform during 
the Reform Period. As we shall see in the following sections, the National Day Civilian 
Parades demonstrated a transition of agriculture policy in China from focusing on 
production & macroeconomic reforms to focusing on living quality and more issue-
specific reforms. 
Qualitative Analysis: 
In the 1984 parade, the “Household Responsibility” formation was led by a set of 
giant physical slogans that displayed the phrase: “Household Responsibility is Good”. The 
“Agricultural Reform” formation centered around a colorful float depicting a model for the 
“Number One Document”. The “Number One Document” refers to the first official policy 
document that the Central Committee of the CPC publishes every year, and in this case, it 
refers to the “Number One Document” that was published every year from 1982 until 1986 
which all specifically focused on agricultural reforms.38 These two formations celebrated 
 
38 Wei, Xiangyuan 魏向远. 2018. “Gaige Kaifang yilai Shenong ‘Zhongyang Yihao Wenjian’ Yanjiu 改革开放
以来涉农 ‘中央一号文件 ’ 研究 [Research on Agriculture Related Central No.1 Document since Reform and 
Opening up]” Shuoshi Xuewei Lunwen 硕士学位论文 Master of Law diss , Kaifeng 开封:  Henan Daxue 河南
大学 University of Henan.  
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one major policy achievement and presented a favorable image of CPC by emphasizing the 
importance of the “Number One Document”.  
Figure 1: The “Household Responsibility” formation in the 1984 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Li, Xianzhong 李显忠. 2016. 1984 Nian Guoqing Dayuebing He Qunzhong Youxing 
(Wanzheng Zhibo) 1984年国庆大阅兵和群众游行（完整直播） [1984 National Day 
Military Parade and Civilian Parade (Full Live Feed)]. May 5, 2016. Youtube video, 40:45. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8 
 
The “Constructing a Civilized Village” formation was centered around a giant 
physical slogan and a float depicting the image of a bounty of crop harvest with flowers. It 
did not present a specific image of what a civilized village would look like, indicating that 
there was no specific plan yet for actually constructing modern villages in China; rather, 
this formation with extreme vagueness was trying to present a future vision for something 
that China did not have power to accomplish during that time. Its vagueness functioned as 
a fill-in-the-blank question for future leaders. Essentially, what Chinese leaders were trying 
to say was: we have presented this future dream for our country, and it will be up to the 
efforts of the next generations to inject specific policies into this dream and then make this 
dream come true.  
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Figure 2: The “Constructing a Civilized Village” formation in the 1984 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Li, Xianzhong 李显忠. 2016. 1984 Nian Guoqing Dayuebing He Qunzhong Youxing 
(Wanzheng Zhibo) 1984年国庆大阅兵和群众游行（完整直播） [1984 National Day 
Military Parade and Civilian Parade (Full Live Feed)]. May 5, 2016. Youtube video, 42:43. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8 
 
In the 1999 parade, there was only one formation dedicated to agriculture. This one 
formation was led by two floats, one depicting the image of a harvest, and the other 
depicting the image of a river dam. The harvest float was centered around a female statue 
holding a slogan with the message: “Agricultural Modernization”. This float indicated an 
emphasis on the modernization of production, but not quality of life. The river dam float 
indicated an emphasis on agricultural infrastructure in terms of major national projects, but 
not in terms of fixing locally specific infrastructural problems. These two floats were then 
followed by a giant block of people marching in unison, whose confetti formed a colored 
image of the word for “Good Harvest” in Chinese. This whole formation in 1999 indicated 
that the Chinese leadership at the time still focused on macroeconomic goals of agricultural 
reforms, which included an emphasis on both production output and national-level 
infrastructure planning.  
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Figure 3: The “Agriculture” formation in the 1999 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Mei Neng Da Yinghua 美能达映画. 2019. 1999 Nian Guoqing 50 Zhounian 
Shengda Yuebing (Gaoqing Wanzheng Ban) 1999年国庆 50周年盛大阅兵（高清完整
版） [1999 50–Year Anniversary National Day Grand Military Parade (HD Full Version)]. 
October 16, 2019. Bilibili video, 83:29. https://www.bilibili.com/video/av71455376/ 
 
In the 2009 parade, there were two formations dedicated to agriculture. The first 
formation was called “Agricultural Development”, and the second one was called 
“Constructing a New Socialist Countryside”. The first formation was very similar to its 
1999 counterpart, with the imagery of a harvest, a green house, and a mechanical harvester. 
The emphasis on sustaining a high level of agricultural production has always existed as 
the principal goal of China’s agricultural development, and we can see that this principal 







Figure 4: The “Agricultural Development” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009年
60周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60–Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 
26, 2017. Youtube video, 1:56:17. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s 
 
The second formation presents a very specific image of what a modern new 
Chinese village would look like. Its float included a model of a library, a streetlamp, a 
citizen service center, and a modern house with a solar panel in the back. This second 
formation and its specificity filled in the blank that was presented by the “Civilized 
Village” formation in 1984. It indicated that China had enough economic power to actually 
began creating and implementing specific policies related to modernizing the rural areas. It 
also indicated that the long-term vague dream of 1984 has been turned into a short-term 
actionable vision. Certain items presented on this float was already being achieved in 2009, 






Figure 5: The “Constructing a New Socialist Countryside” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009年
60周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60–Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 
26, 2017. Youtube video, 1:57:42. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s 
 
In the 2019 parade, there were two formations dedicated to agriculture. The first 
formation was called “Rural Rejuvenation”, and the second one was called “Eliminate 
Poverty”. This time, the order of presence of the two types of formations has changed. This 
time, the formation dedicated to improving of rural living conditions came before the 
formation dedicated to agricultural production and rural economic development. The 
“Rural Rejuvenation” formation was centered around a float that depicted a very detailed 
image of a new and modern Chinese village. In comparison to its counterpart in 2009, this 
float is much more detailed and bigger in size. It depicted clean houses with a clean natural 
environment in both northern and southern architectural style. The people who were 
marching around this float dressed in mostly modern-style clothing. This formation in 
2019 presented three main interesting changes: firstly, the more detailed and bigger-sized 
float indicated that the dream of a “Civilized Village” is being realized right now, and the 
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images being presented on the float are no longer just visions for the future, but actually 
reflections of the present achievements.  
Figure 6: The “Rural Rejuvenation” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
Youtube video, 2:16:17. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s 
 
Secondly, the fact that we see this formation before the “Eliminate Poverty” 
formation meant that the Chinese leadership is now placing a heavy emphasis on the multi-
dimensional nature of rural development. From the beginning of the PRC until the 2010s, 
China’s agricultural policy has focused upon improving production conditions and 
alleviating poverty by raising income levels. This formation in 2019 demonstrated that the 
Chinese leadership is placing an emphasis on non-monetary aspects of poverty alleviation 
and rural development. Improving hygiene, improving environmental protections, and 
improving literacy and education are important goals that are being pushed alongside with 
other traditional agricultural goals as China is moving closer and closer towards 
eradicating absolute rural poverty. This formation in 2019 also shows us that China’s 
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current agricultural reforms are being connected more and more closely with Xi Jinping’s 
own visions and policy goals, which means that Xi Jinping is trying to distinguish his 
agricultural achievements from efforts of previous leaders. 
Figure 7: The “Eliminate Poverty” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
Youtube video, 2:25:03. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s 
 
Thirdly, if we compare the traditional-culture elements of these formations, we can 
see that the Chinese leadership in 2019 is not only emphasizing improvement of rural 
areas’ material condition, but also emphasizing a need for change in rural areas’ spiritual 
condition. In 1984, the agricultural formations included a lot of cultural elements such as 
traditional instruments, traditional clothing, and traditionally styled floats. In 1999, these 
cultural elements were presently in a very limited fashion by only having the marching 
masses wearing traditional clothing and waving traditional fans. In 2009, these traditional 
elements were only visible on the marching of traditional opera boats. In 2019, the 
marching masses wore modern style clothing, and the only culture that was present was the 
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static images of traditional painting on the walls of the fake buildings on the float. This 
slow process removal of traditional elements indicated a process of modernization of rural 
culture. This modernization has been a heavy point of emphasis by Xi Jinping’s 
administration. During his term in office so far, both the central and local governments 
have announced various kinds of policies that tried to encourage rural people to move 
away from any harmful traditions such as wasteful spending on food during social 
occasions. 
Quantitative Analysis of Government Work Reports:  













 In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to agriculture in 
government work reports（政府工作报告）from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the 
four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term 
in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure.  
 
39 Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report. 
40 Please note that from 1961 to 1963, from 1965 to 1974, and from 1976 to 1977, the State Council did not 





Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin 
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 We can see that agricultural policy was heavily emphasized during the very early 
years of Deng Xiaoping’s term. We know that China’s Reform-Era commenced with 
agricultural reforms that involved the annulment of the People’s Commune system and the 
installment of the Household Responsibility System. This explains why we see a high 
frequency of usage of agricultural terms from 1978 to 1982, which was the time period that 
began with the first villager-initiated experimentation on household-responsibility for 
production in Anhui Province and ended with the official recognition of the Household 
Responsibility System by the Central Committee of the CPC. 
 After 1982, we see a sudden drop in the frequency of mention of agricultural terms 
and then a relative long period of lower frequencies of mention from 1984 to 1999. After 
the establishment of the first special economic zone in Shenzhen in 1980, China’s reform 
activities have been focused on opening-up in the coastal urban front, so we could 
reasonably expect a relatively weaker emphasis on agricultural policy after the enactment 
of the single most important agricultural policy in 1982. The only rise in emphasis on 
agriculture policy can be seen on the spike in the usage of “poverty” related terms from 
1994 to 1997. This spike is highly likely to be the reflection of a major policy action that 
was called the “Eight-Seven National Poverty Alleviation Plan” （国家八七扶贫攻坚计
划）. This plan was created in 1994 by Jiang Zemin’s administration with the intent to 
alleviate extreme poverty for the 80 million people living in rural areas within the last 7 
years of the 20th century.41 Although this poverty alleviation effort had much success in 
improving people’s lives in the rural areas, it was not mentioned during the 1999 parade as 
 
41 Guo Wu Yuan 国务院 State Council. 1994. “Guo Wu Yuan Yinfa ‘Guojia Baqi Fupin Gongjian Jihua’ 国务
院印发《国家八七扶贫攻坚计划》[The State Council publishes ‘The 8-7 National Plan for Poverty 
Alleviation’]” .” In Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang Xinshiqi Nianjian 中国改革开放新时期年鉴 [Yearbook of the 
New age of Reform and Open Up in China], edited by Wang, Zhenchuan 王振川, 352–56. Beijing 北京: 
Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi Chubanshe 中国民主法制出版社 [China Democracy and Legal Publishing House].  
 53 
a major achievement. This can be explained, once again, by the fact that China’s reform 
efforts during Jiang Zemin’s administration was focused much more on urban open-up.  
 If we look at the two trends described above together, we can see that the 1984 
parade served both as a presentation for current achievements as well as a presentation for 
long term future goals. After having seen some success in agricultural reform, the Chinese 
leadership began to envision long term goals for future agricultural development. The 
“Household Responsibility” formation and the “Agricultural Reform” formation both 
presented what the CPC had achieved so far between 1978 and 1984; the “Civilized 
Village” formation presented a vague long-term vision for the next step in agricultural 
development: moving from production-related reforms to life-quality-related reforms. 
Since China did not have the economic power to achieve this dream of a modern village, 
this future vision was only present vaguely once in 1984 and did not appear again in 1999. 
In between 1984 and the beginning of the new century, we see a relatively low level of 
emphasis on agriculture, indicating that the future vision presented in 1984’s parade was 
indeed only a dream-for-later, not a plan that can be immediately realized.  
 In 2009, the “Civilized Village” formation was presented once again in a more 
specific fashion as China has gained enough economic strength to change the “Rural 
Modernization” plan into a short-term vision. In 2005, the Chinese government already 
began taking actions to renovate rural areas, so this formation in 2009 is both a reflection 
of the actions that were already taking place as well as a signal for upcoming major policy 
actions.42 After only 4 years, in 2013, Xi Jinping announced a new plan to eradicate rural 
poverty, and a series of major rural policies were announced to aim at improving living 
 
42 Cao, Yingwang 曹应旺. 2012. “Shiliuda Yilai Woguo Jianshe Shehuizhuyi Xinnongcun de Sange Shijiao” 十
六大以来我国建设社会主义新农村的三个视角 [Three perspectives on the Construction of Socialist New 
Countryside since the 16th Party Congress] Edited by Li, Zhentong 李振通. Hongqi Wengao 红旗文稿, no. 13: 
18–21.  
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conditions in the rural areas by building new toilets, better roads, and safer houses.43 We 
can see the upcoming major policy actions from two trends after 2009. After 2009, we see 
a consistent drop in the usage of “Agriculture” and “Farmer” related terms; however, we 
see a rise in the usage of “Poverty” related terms. These two trends have two connections 
with what we see the in the 2009 and 2019 parades.  
Firstly, the dramatic increase of detailedness of the “Civilized Village” formations 
from 2009 to 2019 indicated a transition from a focus on the macroeconomic goals of 
agricultural reform to a focus on the specific goal of eradicating absolute poverty in the 
rural areas. As the presentation of agricultural reform becomes less related to production 
and more about improving people’s lives, we could reasonably expect a rise in emphasis 
on poverty alleviation and a relative decline in emphasis on agricultural production. 
Secondly, as China has achieved much in terms of eradicating absolute poverty in 
the country’s most isolated rural areas during Xi Jinping’s administration so far, it would 
be reasonable to conclude that we would see a sustained high level of usage of “Poverty” 
related terms in government work reports as China approaches the final deadline of 
poverty eradication in 2021; we would also expect to see the images of “Civilized Village” 
and “Poverty Eradication” being prioritized over the image of “Agricultural Reform”. The 
image of “Agricultural Reform”, which is related to the production aspect of agricultural 
policy, was present during the 2019 parade as a mere “Tribute to the Past” formation 
within a segment dedicated to celebrating Deng Xiaoping’s life. We can see from this 
change that the idea of improving agricultural production has been pushed away to become 
a past tense, while the idea of improving living conditions and eradicating poverty have 
been pushed to the front to become a source of pride for the present.           
 
43 Wang, Tengfei 王腾飞. 2018. “Xi Jinping Xinshidai Tuopingongjian Sixiang Yanjiu 习近平新时代脱贫攻坚
思想研究 [Research on Xi Jinping’s thought of the Fight Against Poverty in New Era]” Shuoshi Xuewei 
Lunwen 硕士学位论文 Master Diss, Chang Chun 长春: Jilin Daxue 吉林大学 University of Jilin.  
 55 
Figure 9: The “Hopeful Fields” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
















Quantitative Analysis of Party Congress Reports: 
Figure 10: Trend of Frequency of usage of Agriculture-related terms in Party Reports (1954-2019) 
44 
 
44 Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report. 
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In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to agriculture in 
Communist Party Congress Reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four 
parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in 
office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. There 
have been 12 Party Congresses since the founding of the PRC in 1949. There have been 8 
Party Congresses since 1976: the 11th Congress in 1977, the 12th Congress in 1982, the 13th 
Congress in 1987, the 14th Congress in 1992, the 15th Congress in 1997, the 16th Congress 
in 2002, the 17th Congress in 2007, the 18th Congress in 2012, and the 19th Congress in 
2017. Mao Zedong’s administration corresponds to the 8th, 9th, and 10th Congresses. Deng 
Xiaoping’s administration corresponds to the 11th, 12th, and 13th Congresses. Jiang Zemin’s 
administration corresponds to the 14th and 15th Congresses. Hu Jintao’s administration 
started and ended with the 16th and the 18th Congresses. Xi Jinping’s administration started 
with the 18th Congress, and he hosted the 19th Congress in 2017. 
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We can see from the series of blue dots that since 1978, agriculture maintained a 
generally important presence in topics discussed by the Party Congresses. Similar to the 
government work reports of the early 1980s, we see a very high emphasis in agriculture 
during the 12th Party Congress. Similarly, as we move into the late Deng period and early 
Jiang Period, we see a general decline in the relative importance of agriculture from the 
13th to the 15th Congress. Since the 16th Congress in 2002, we see very little variation in the 
emphasis on agriculture, which is different from the highly volatile changes we saw in the 
government work reports. 
This trend of stability of emphasis in Party Congress Reports presents us with two 
important implications. Firstly, this trend can help us understand the different functions of 
the government work reports and the Party Reports. Government work reports are 
published annually, so their content changes year after year according to that each year’s 
specific circumstances. They are a reflection of the present, and they contain important 
policy information that are specific to what has been achieved for the previous year and 
what needs to be done next years. Party Reports, on the other hands, are published usually 
quinquennially. Their content, once published, will guide China’s development for the next 
five years. Rather than outlining every specific policy and development goals, the Party 
Reports provide political rhetoric and general policy direction to government work in the 
future. Government work reports are more specific and circumstantial than Party Reports, 
so that’s why we see this difference in the level of variations. Secondly, this trend tells us 
that since the 16th Congress, China has been consistently focusing on agricultural 
development as one of its principal policy goals. Even though we see a fluctuating image 
from government work reports, the steady image we see from the Party Reports shows us 
that the Communist Party has established agriculture as a long-term policy area of focus.  
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This emphasis of stability by the Party can be seen in the parade as well. There are 
some policies that would disappear in the parades as time go on, and there are some 
policies that show up in some parades but not others. For example, there is a formation 
called “World Peace” in 1984 that demonstrated a theme and anti-imperialism and 
internationalism. This formation with a very Marxist-Leninist view of the world never 
returned again in later parades, and the topic of “World Peace” would be presented again in 
2009 and 2019 with a much less ideological focus on international cooperation. The 
agriculture theme, however, is always present in the parades.  
Figure 11: A sheep-shaped float in the “Great Leap Forward” achievement section in the 1959 National Day Civilian 
Parade 
 
Source: Revolutionary Force. Qingzhu Jianguo Shi Zhounian庆祝建国十周年 [1959 
CHINA NATIONAL DAY]. May 7, 2016. Youtube video, 1:02:11. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5psI_ao2q0&t=3749s 
 
Ever since the first National Day Civilian Parade in 1950, agricultural has 
maintained a consistent presence. From available video evidence from parades of 1959, 
1966, and 1970, we can see that even while many other policies have disappeared from 
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public view during the height of the Cultural Revolution, an agricultural formation 
managed to stay as the single most important and indispensable formation during all the 
parades in the history of the PRC. After 1978, all the four parades have placed agriculture 
either as the first or the close-second formation in the segment that is dedicated to 
showcase important policy areas and achievements of the current administration. All of the 
evidence indicates to us that parades can both reflect specific government policy goals as 
well as broad policy directions. 
Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law: 
The second type of the parades’ signaling functions involves foreshadowing 
upcoming changes in problem solving strategy. The problems of corruption and rule of law 
have been a long-existing headache for Chinese leaders. Corruption within the political 
system had caused the Chinese people to rise up and rebel against their kings and emperors 
time after time. Even the strongest of dynasties such as Han, Tang, or Ming could not 
escape the fate of being plagued by corruption at the end of their reign. Ever since its 
establishment in 1921, the CPC has tried many times to rid itself of corruption by 
implementing various kinds of anti-corruption campaigns. As we shall see from the 
following sections, the National Day Civilian Parades have been used by the Chinese 
leadership as a platform to show strength and dedication to anti-corruption right before Xi 
Jinping’s intensive anti-corruption campaign. The parades are also used to show strength 
and dedication to issues relating to rule of law right before Xi Jinping brought rule of law 
up into the public front. Both of these issues have been long-existing issues that preceded 
their first appearance in the parades; however, due to their contentious and politically 
sensitive nature, they had not gotten much public appearance in politically charged 
occasions such as the parades. 
Qualitative Analysis: 
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 In 1984, neither anti-corruption nor rule of law appeared in any format during the 
parade. In 1984, most formations were dedicated to various policies areas regarding 
economic reform, indicating that the reform focus of the Chinese government at the time 
was on economic issues rather than on political issues. In 1999, neither anti-corruption nor 
rule of law appeared in any format during the parade. In 1999, most formations were 
dedicated to present various policy achievements that the CPC has been making since the 
beginning of the reform period, indicating that the focus of the Chinese government at the 
time was still on furthering economic reform and development. It is important to note, 
however, that an absence from the parades does not equal to an absence in actual policy 
making. An absence from the parades just meant that either the Chinese government did 
not perceive anti-corruption/rule of law as positive policy areas to celebrate, or that the 










Figure 12: The “Democratic Politics” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade 
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Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009年
60周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60–Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 
26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:02:58. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s 
 
 In 2009, anti-corruption and rule of law made their debuts in the parades. The 
“Democratic Politics” formation（民主政治） in 2009 is centered around a float in shape 
of a model of the Great People’s Hall（人民大会堂）. On the sides of the float, there was 
a slogan displaying the following phrase: “Uphold and Improve the System of National 
People’s Congress”（坚持和完善人民代表大会制度）. On the float, several 
representatives of various political parties, social classes, and minority groups can be seen 
waving with flowers in their hand. Right after the “Democratic Politics” formation, we 
have the “Rule of Law” formation（依法治国）. The “Rule of Law” formation is 
centered around a float in shape of a model of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China. On the sides of the float, there was a slogan displaying the following phrase: 
“Construction a socialist legal regime with Chinese characteristics”（建设中国特色社会
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主义法律体系）. On the float, several representatives of law enforcement officers can be 
seen saluting towards the leadership.  
Figure 13: The “Rule of Law” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009年
60周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60–Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 
26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:03:57. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s 
 
 At the first glance, the Anti-Corruption theme was not directly present in either of 
these formations; however, if we think about the implication of emphasizing both 
democratic rule and rule of law, we will see that both of these formations existed to 
support the indirect theme of Anti-Corruption. I argue that these formations sent a very 
important signal regarding the manner in which China’s future anti-corruption efforts will 
be conducted. Whether it’s Chairman Mao’s “Rectification Movement” in 1957（整风运
 63 
动）45, or Jiang Zemin’s “Three Stresses Campaign” in 1998（三讲教育）46, or Hu 
Jintao’s “Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of Communist Party Members” in 
2005（保先教育）47, China’s anti-corruption efforts since 1949 had largely been rooted 
in a strategy which can be called “Internal Party Rectification” （党内整风）. This 
strategy concentrated anti-corruption efforts within the party structure, without much 
public participation or supervision. This strategy usually would not lead to any mass arrests 
of corrupt officials; rather, the goal of this strategy is to warn party members of their 
wrongdoing instead of directly punishing them for their crimes. Essentially, the “Internal 
Party Rectification” strategy treats corruption as a style-of-conduct problem（作风问题） 
rather than a criminal-charge-problem（犯罪问题）. Even though corruption has been a 
crime since 1949, the only instances of mass arrests and prosecutions of corrupt officials 
took place during Chairman Mao’s administration. After 1978, although there had been 
arrests and prosecutions, the scale and intensity of these legal actions was never sufficient 
to toggle corruption’s increasingly negative impact on China’s economic and social 
development.   
 The two formations in 2009 presented a different strategy for fighting against 
corruption. This new strategy brings the criminal nature of corruption to the front and tries 
to fight corruption by strengthening and reinventing the organization of China’s legal 
system. Rather than only educating party members about proper values and correct style of 
 
45 Tang, Zhengmang 唐正芒, and Yan Hu 胡燕. 2006. “Lue lun Yi Jiu Wu Qi Nian Zhi Yi Jiu Wu Ba Nian de 
Quanmin Zhengfeng Yundong” 略论一九五七年至一九五八年的全民整风运动 [A Brief Discussion on the 
Rectification Movement of the Entire Nation in 1957 and 1958]. Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu 中共党史研究, no. 
3: 66–69.  
46 Ma, Xianzhang 马宪章. 2001. “Youyi de Tansuo Chenggong de Shijian-‘Sanjiang’ Jiaoyu de Huigu yu 
Sikao’ ” 有益的探索 成功的实践——‘三讲’教育的回顾与思考. [ A beneficial exploration and a successful 
practice-Analysis and Retrospective of the ‘Three Requirement’ Educational Campaign]. Qiu Shi 求是, no. 1: 
49–53.  
47 Qiu, Suqin 邱素琴. 2005. “Kaizhan Baochi Dangyuan Xianjinxing Jiaoyu de Yiyi” 开展保持党员先进性教
育的意义 [The Meaning of commencing the ‘Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of Party Members]. 
Dangzheng Luntan 党政论坛, no. 1: 14–15.  
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conduct, China is now adding a criminal-law dimensional to the anti-corruption efforts. By 
arresting and prosecuting corrupt officials in civilian courts as if they are common 
criminals, China opens up the process of anti-corruption and allows for some limited 
public participation and supervision.  
Figure 14: The “Strict Governance of the Party” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
Youtube video, 2:39:31. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s 
 
 In the 2019 parade, there were two formations dedicated to rule of law and anti-
corruption. The first formation is called “Democracy and Rule of Law”（民主法治）, and 
the second formation is called “Strict Governance of the Party”（从严治党）. By looking 
at these two formations, we can finally see the end result of the new strategy of anti-
corruption that the 2009 parade foreshadowed for us. In the “Strict Governance of the 
Party” formation, we can see the anti-corruption theme directly and visibly. The “Strict 
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Governance of the Party” formation is centered around a float in shape of a model of the 
Constitution of the CPC. On the float, there are also models depicting various other 
important laws and regulations regarding anti-corruption and party member conduct. The 
whole formation expresses a very legal-centric atmosphere, which matches what is being 
displayed in the “Democracy and Rule of Law” formation. 
Figure 15: The “Democracy and Rule of Law” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
Youtube video, 2:17:11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s 
 
 The “Democracy and Rule of Law” formation is centered around a float in the 
shape of the Constitution of the PRC. On top of the float, there is also a vote box as well as 
a model of the famous “Radiant Star” roof decoration in the Great People’s Hall（人民大
会堂穹顶）. Both of these formations have something in common with their 2009 
counterparts: they are all centered around the imagery of the ultimate symbols of rule of 
law and democratic accountability. Whether it’s the constitution, the party constitution, or 
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the Great People’s Hall, these formations demonstrated a common theme: the ideal of Rule 
of Law is no longer a policy in preparation; Hu Jintao’s administration had established 
many firm base works for rule of law, and Xi Jinping is now moving forward in employing 
rule of law as the not only the guiding principle of ruling the country, but most importantly 
as the guiding principle of fighting against rampaging political corruption.   
Quantitative analysis of Government Work Reports: 




In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to anti-corruption/rule 
of law in government work reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades 
took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in office are 
marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. Similar to what 
 
48 Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report. 
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we have seen in the agricultural data, we see a lot of variation in the usage of anti-
corruption/rule of law related terms. In the very early years of the Reform Era, we see a 
relatively low level of emphasis on these two policy areas as the leadership at the time was 
focused on fixing the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution as well as enacting important 
economic reforms to improve people’s living conditions.  
From 1985 to 1990, we see a sudden spike in focus on these two policy areas. This 
sudden spike was perhaps a response on part of the government in face of the increasingly 
discontent society regarding corruption. This spike then slowly tampered off after Jiang 
Zemin took power, while we see a gradual rise in emphasis on rule of law during the same 
period of time. This rise in emphasis on rule of law and the accompanied gradual decrease 
in emphasis on anti-corruption are two good reflections of both what we saw in the parades 
and what we did not see in the parades. 
One of the main demands of students during the 1989 Incident was regarding 
political corruption. The fourth of the 7 initial demands drafted by students in April stated 
the following: “(We the students) demand that all national leaders and cadres are to publish 
their actual income and income of their families, and we demand that the government is to 
have a serious investigation into the problem of officials engaging in smuggling and 
insider trading.”49 As we can see, due to the fact that students invoked corruption as one of 
their principle cause for protest and demonstration, the Chinese corruption had to respond 
by increasing its emphasis in policy making; however, also due to the fact that the 1989 
Incident greatly destabilized Chinese politics as well as the Chinese society, anything 
related to the incident would be seen as favorable subjects to be presented during a 
 
49 Zhao, Dingxin. 2001. “A Brief History of the 1989 Movement.” In The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society 
Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement, 148–49. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
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National Day Civilian Parade. This is probably the principal reason why we do not see the 
imagery of anti-corruption nor the imagery of rule of law in the 1999 Parade. 
 Going from the late Jiang Zemin administration to the Hu Jintao administration, we 
see a general increase in the emphasis of rule of law and a slow decrease in emphasis of 
anti-corruption. These two trends have two implications: firstly, the idea of rule of law is 
now being promoted as a subject in policy making; secondly, a slow decrease in emphasis 
of anti-corruption did not mean that Hu Jintao’s administration was soft on anti-corruption.  
I argue that since the 15th Party Congress in 1997, China has begun a process of 
establishing a policy basis for rule of law and eventually a legal basis for a massive anti-
corruption effort. This process would explain why we see a gradual rise in emphasis in rule 
of law but a slow decline in emphasis on anti-corruption. Hu Jintao’s administration 
maintained the old strategy of anti-corruption effort while it was working on the creation of 
a newly improved legal regime. Due to Hu Jintao’s push for creating a harmonious society, 
we do not see much publicity for anti-corruption efforts; however, a strong and reformed 
legal basis for legal action centered anti-corruption efforts was already under construction 
in the background. By the time Xi Jinping had consolidated his power in around 2013, we 
see both a rise in emphasis of rule of law as well as anti-corruption. I argue that Xi 
Jinping’s administration is both implementing the new anti-corruption strategy as well as 
perfecting the legal regime during the process of using this legal regime to combat 
corruption.  
Many existing research works on the Hu Jintao administration would suggest that 
the contrary to my argument. Many scholars would argue that the Hu Jintao’s weakness, 
his lack of political capital, and his unwillingness to have a high public profile were the 
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main reason why he was not able to act firmly against corruption.50 51 While these 
arguments have their own merits in trying to figure out why Hu Jintao didn’t do a lot of 
tough reforms, I would point out that it is a very difficult task to understand the true 
intention behind a leader’s decision. Unlike Western politicians who love to appear in front 
of the television for an interview, Chinese leaders have been generally reluctant to be 
under the focus of the spotlight. In each case of argument, it would hard to find direct 
evidence for what is the real intention behind Hu Jintao’s decision to not act firmly against 
corruption. 
Quantitative analysis of party congress reports: 




50 Brown, Kerry. 2012. “Hu Jintao: China’s Silent Ruler.” In , 197–200. World Scientific.  
51 Lam, W. Wo-Lap. 2006. . “The Rise of Hu Jintao and the Traits of the Fourth-Generation Leadership.” In 
Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges, 21-22. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.  
52 Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report. 
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In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to anti-corruption/rule 
of law in Communist Party Congress reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the 
four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term 
in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. As 
we can see, from beginning of the Reform Era to the early 1990s, both policy areas 
received relatively less emphasis in Party rhetoric and future policy visions. In 1997, the 
15th Party Congress announced the goal of constructing a socialist legal regime with 
Chinese characteristics for the first time, which is where we see the first major rise in 
emphasis for both policy areas. After 1997, the two policy areas maintained a consistent 
and high level of importance from the 16th to the 18th Party Congress. This indicates that 
after the 15th Party Congress both anti-corruption and rule of law have become a staple part 
of Party rhetoric and future policy visions. As the negative effects of the 1989 Incident on 
anti-corruption faded away with time, anti-corruption can be brought up into the view of 
public policy making. Similarly, as China’s economic strength increased and its 
governance style modernized, the issue of rule of law can also be brought up into the 
public’s eyes. After more than a decade of heavy emphasis in policy making as well as 
party rhetoric, these two policy areas finally made their first public appearance in the 2009 
parade.  
This first debut has an important implication for the discussion of what may be 
considered as politically sensitive in China. Although it is undoubtable that these two 
issues are still politically charged and thus can be considered as very sensitive topics, due 
to the actual progress that the government has been making and the many positive impacts 
that this progress has been producing, the positive sides of these two policy areas are now 
presentable enough for the government to place them on display in front of the public 
during politically significant occasions such as the National Day Civilian Parades. In 2019, 
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both policy areas are on presentation, which indicates that the Chinese government is now 
considering its achievements on these two areas are major victories that should be publicly 
celebrated. From hardly getting a mention in Party reports in the 1980s to getting more and 
more mentions in Party reports later on and then finally being able to be presented in 
public, the issues of anti-corruption/rule of law have made a complete transformation from 
issues that can only remain under-the-counter to issues that can be openly discussed to a 
limited extend.  
 
Ethnic Policy:  
The third type of the parades’ signaling functions involves the presentation of a 
change in policy direction. Similar to the issue of corruption, ethnic policy has been 
another contentious issue for the Chinese government since the beginning. During the early 
years of the PRC, China’s ethnic policy was guided by a more Soviet view of ethnicity. 
Minority ethnic regions （民族地区）were largely left along to govern themselves based 
on the policy of “Regional Ethnic Autonomy”（民族区域自治）.53 Without a doubt, this 
autonomy was limited and tightly supervised by the Central government. As the People’s 
Liberation Army marched into areas of minority ethnic concentration, they brought with 
them not only words of land reform, but also communist party cadres who were trained to 
set up both state and party institutions in even the most remote of the country’s minority 
villages and towns. Nevertheless, for a very long time until the Cultural Revolution, China 
both emphasized the individuality of its 55 minority groups as well as an idea of bringing 
everyone united under the umbrella of a unified socialist state.  
 
53 Zhang, Jiao 张娇, Zheni Li 李祯妮, and Binghao Jin 金炳镐. 2019. “Xin Zhongguo 70 Nian Minzu Quyu 
Zihi Zhengce de Fazhan” 新中国 70 年民族区域自治政策的发展[The Development of Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy Policy in 70 years since the Foundation of New China]. Heilongjiang Minzu Congkan 黑龙江民
族丛刊, no. 6: 15–16.  
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Figure 18: The “Uyghur Dance” performance in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic 
 
Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' 
with English subtitles”. October 11, 2013. Youtube video, 1:49:58 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQaK3tL6qIE 
 
Figure 19: The “Tibetan Singing” performance by Tseitain Zhoima in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic 
 
Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' 









Figure 20: The “Thai Peacock Dance” performance in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic 
 
Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' 
with English subtitles”. October 11, 2013. Youtube video, 1:55:24 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQaK3tL6qIE 
 
Figure 21: The “Korean Drum Dance” performance in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic 
 
Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' 
with English subtitles”. October 11, 2013. Youtube video, 1:57:12 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQaK3tL6qIE 
 
The 1964 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic （东方红歌舞剧史诗）was an 
excellent reflection of this early vision of ethnic policy. In this epic display of Chinese 
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revolutionary performance arts, there is a section dedicated to the portrayal of ethnic 
minority culture. In the segment titled “The Chinese People Has Arisen”（中国人民站起
来）, representatives from the Mongolian, the Uyghur, the Tibetan, the Thai, the Li, and 
the Miao ethnic groups performed their own ethnic dances in celebration of the founding of 
the PRC.54 These minority performers came one ethnicity after another, establishing a clear 
and separate identity for each and every one of their own group, but all congregate at the 
end with a common sentiment of unity and brotherhood. This song and dance epic, with so 
many other similar examples of minority art performance, demonstrated clearly the guiding 
principle for China’s ethnic policy at the time. Ethnic minority groups are encouraged to 
form their own distinguishing identities by promoting their own art, language, and customs 
through state sponsorship; however, there would always be a limit to the promotion of 
these identities. All of these individualities must be compatible with the broader ideology 
of “Greater Unity of All Ethnic Peoples” （各族人民大团结）55. 
Later on, after the Reform Period, China’s ethnic policy would soon change to a 
different direction. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, China became very 
wary of its own ethnic groups. It is since this time that China began to slowly change its 
direction in ethnic policy making. After the 2008 and 2009 riots in Lhasa and Urumqi, both 
the Chinese society and the Chinese government saw a need in changing course on its 
ethnic policy amid the fear of terrorism and the need to establish greater national unity. 
After Xi Jinping took power, the threat of terrorist groups such as the “Turkestan Islamic 
 
54 Wilcox, Emily. "A Revolt from Within: Contextualizing Revolutionary Ballet." In Revolutionary Bodies: 
Chinese Dance and the Socialist Legacy, 148. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019.  
55 Ma, Anping 马安平. 2014. “Yinyue Wudao Shishi ‘Dong Fang Hong’ Zhong de Shaoshu Minzu Xingxiang 
Biaoshu” 音乐舞蹈史诗《东方红》中的少数民族形象表述 [The Visual Representation of Ethnic Nations in 
the Song and Dance Epic ‘East is Red’]. Yinyue Shikong 音乐时空, Yinyue Zhuanti Yanjiu 音乐专题研究, no. 
11: 36.  
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Movement” became the principal source of security threat in Xinjiang.56 During Xi’s 
administration, the idea of ethnic unity is being emphasized much more than ethnic 
individuality, and as we shall see, the change in presentation of ethnic policy in the parades 
would match relatively well with what is going on during this change of direction. 
Qualitative Analysis: 
Figure 22: The “Ethnic national dance” segment in the 1984 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Li, Xianzhong 李显忠. 2016. 1984 Nian Guoqing Dayuebing He Qunzhong Youxing 
(Wanzheng Zhibo) 1984年国庆大阅兵和群众游行（完整直播） [1984 National Day 
Military Parade and Civilian Parade (Full Live Feed)]. May 5, 2016. Youtube video, 50:24. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8 
 
 In the 1984 parade, there was not a stand-alone formation for ethnic policy. The 
only portrayal of ethnicity was presented as a part of the cultural policy segment. In this 
segment, dancers from various ethnic groups performed their own dances while marching 
 
56 Yang, Fuxue 杨富学. 2015. “ ‘Dong Tujuesitan’: Yige you Yuyna er Dili zai Zhengzhi de Weimingti” ‘东突
厥斯坦’:一个由语言而地理再政治的伪命题 [“East Turkestan”:A Pseudo-proposition Derived from 
Language, Geography to Politics]. Shihezi Daxue Xuebao石河子大学学报, Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban哲学社
会科学版, 29 (4): 1–9.  
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across the Tiananmen square. As expected, since the focus of policy making during the 
early Reform Era was on economic development, social issues such as ethnic policy did 
not get much emphasis during this time period. 
Figure 23: The “Jiang Zemin” formation in the 1999 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Mei Neng Da Yinghua 美能达映画. 2019. 1999 Nian Guoqing 50 Zhounian 
Shengda Yuebing (Gaoqing Wanzheng Ban) 1999年国庆 50周年盛大阅兵（高清完整
版） [1999 50–Year Anniversary National Day Grand Military Parade (HD Full Version)]. 
October 16, 2019. Bilibili video, 105:17. https://www.bilibili.com/video/av71455376/ 
 
 In the 1999 parade, we see a much stronger presentation of ethnic policy. Although 
there was still not a stand-alone formation for ethnic policy, the ideal of ethnic unity is 
being presented in a much more overt way. In the formation dedicated to Jiang Zemin 
himself, representatives from the 56 ethnic nations marched around a giant portrait of Jiang 
Zemin. In the CCTV commentary, the news reporter introduced this formation by saying: 
“This segment presents the image of all ethnic peoples uniting around the Party Center 
under the core leadership of Comrade Jiang Zemin…” （各族人民紧密团结在以江泽民
同志为核心的党中央周围）. This drastically different presentation of ethnic policy can 
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be explained by two reasons. Firstly, I argue that the image of all ethnic groups uniting 
around the portrait of the highest leadership can be considered as a response to the Yining 
Riots which took place only two years prior in 1997. On February 5th, 1997, a series of 
terrorism-inspired riots took place in the city of Yining in Xinjiang. Islamic extremists and 
Uyghur ethnic separatists killed 7 Han ethnic residents and hundreds were injured.57 This 
series of riots attracted attention from Jiang Zemin, who personally required law 
enforcement forces to “quickly resolve this case with utmost diligence and seriousness”. It 
is reasonable to argue that the imagery of heightened ethnic unity in the 1999 parade is at 
least partially connected with this violent display of inter-ethnic violence and separatism. 
The second reason would be that this display of ethnic unity in 1999 was just a 
commencement of a 2-decade long process of a turn of direction in ethnic policy. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union which involved the separation of all the ethnic republics 
and after the 1997 riots, the Chinese leadership had realized that it was necessary to begin 
changing direction in how much they emphasized ethnic unity. I argue that starting from 
Jiang Zemin’s administration, the Chinese government began to consider making policies 
that would reinforce a united Chinese national identity rather than emphasizing individual 








57 Chen, Lan 陈蓝. 2007. “1990-2007: Zhongguo Fanji ‘Dongtu’ Shiqinian’ ” 1990－2007：中国反击‘东突’十






Figure 24: The “Love my China” dance performance in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009年
60周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60–Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 
26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:16:39. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s 
 
Figure 25: The “Unite and Go Forward” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade 
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Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009年
60周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60–Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 
26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:18:01. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s 
 
 In the 2009 parades, we see that now ethnic policy has been singled out with a 
formation to its own. The “Ethnic policy” formation, which was called “Unite and Go 
Forward” （团结奋进）, appeared after a marching dance performance by representatives 
from all ethnic groups. This formation was centered around a float in the shape of the 
Chinese flag pointing forward. In this formation, we can clearly see the theme of “Ethnic 
Unity”. The 56 nations marching around a Chinese flag indicates that the Chinese 
leadership has begun to actively promote the idea of a shared Chinese national identity. By 
using the Chinese flag as the centerpiece of display in this formation, we can also 
reasonably infer that the content of “Ethnic Unity” is also changing from “Unity of All 
Ethnic Peoples” to “Unity of the Chinese Nations”. In a sense, after the terrible shocks of 
the 2008 Lhasa riot which took place right before the Olympic Games, a Chinese 
nationality based on a common political ideology and a common civic identity 
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overwhelmingly took over as more important than a Chinese nationality that was based on 










Figure 26: The “Ethnic Unity” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
 
58 Wang, Mingming 王鸣鸣. 2009. “Cong Lasa 3.14 Shijian kan Xifang dui Zhongguo de Pianjian” 从拉萨
3·14 事件看西方对中国的偏见 [Western bias against China in the 3.14 Lhasa Incident]. Quanqiu Zhengzhi yu 
Anquan Baogao 全球政治与安全报告. Beijing 北京: Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 
Yanjiusuo 中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所.  
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Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
Youtube video, 2:18:52. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s 
 
 In the 2019 Parade, we can see that ethnic policy has now been completely singled 
out as a formation of its own, not just a part of another segment. In 2009, the “Unite and 
Go Forward” formation and the ethnic dance performance were technically an introductory 
piece of the segment titled “Beautiful China”. Essentially, the 2009 formation still did not 
present ethnic policy as a separate and stand-alone policy area with an equal status with 
other major policy areas such as agriculture or industrial development. In 2019, ethnic 
policy was not only presented with its own formation, but also it was presented as a stand-
alone policy area alongside other policy areas as equals. The “Ethnic Unity” formation 
（民族团结）is centered around a float in shape of a giant red vase decorated with artistic 
renderings of ethnic figures. In the CCTV commentary, the news reporter used this 
following phrase to introduce this formation: “…the 56 nations…are connected with blood 
and veins” （血脉相连）. Although in this formation, everyone in the marching crowd 
dressed up in their own ethnic clothing, it is undoubtful that the focus of this formation is 
overwhelmingly on the idea of unity rather than individuality. Unlike the previous 3 
parades, this 2019 formation greatly reduced the element of presentation of ethnic dance 
performance by only including a tiny troupe of dancers in front of the “Ethnic Unity” 
formation. I argue that everything we are seeing in the 2019 formation reasonably indicates 
that the direction of China’ ethnic policy has officially changed completely into one that 
that still protects the basic idea of ethnic autonomy, but now overwhelmingly emphasizes a 
unified Chinese ethnic identity over separate ethnic identities of the 55 minority groups. 
Quantitative analysis of Government Work Reports: 
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In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to ethnic policy in 
government work reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took 
place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in office are 
marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. By looking at the 
yellow line, we can see a relatively higher emphasis of ethnic individuality over ethnic 
unity. The yellow line values are calculated by contracting blue line values (terms related 
to ethnic unity) with orange line values (terms related to ethnic individuality). Later on in 
the 1980s, we still see a general heavier emphasis of individuality over unity. This trend 
matches what we saw in the 1984 parade, which was not really much of any presentation 
of the ethnic policy except for a dance performance that highlights the individual cultural 
identities of the ethnic nations. After 1990, we see a period of time of higher emphasis of 
unity over individuality from 1991 to 1998. As explained in the previous section, this 
 
59 Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report. 
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period marked the start of the change in ethnic policy direction. Due to the wary of ethnic 
separatism after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as a response to the terrorism-
inspired riots in 1997, we can reasonably expect a higher level of emphasis on unity during 
this time period. This also matches what we saw in the 1999 parade, which was the first 
display of any kind of ethnic unity during the Reform Era. From 1999 to 2007, we see that 
both unity and individuality became equally emphasized. I argue that the reason why we 
see this more equal emphasis of the two policy directions was due to the “Harmonious 
Society” objective of the Hu Jintao administration.60 I believe that in order to achieve 
social harmony in the minority ethnic regions, the Hu Jintao wanted to both promote unity 
while giving space for the individual ethnic identities in order to not spark any ethnic 
conflict.61 This trend was cut short after 2008 as we can see from the graph. From 2008 
and on, the yellow line follows a generally increasing trend, which indicates that ethnic 
unity is increasingly being emphasized as the threat of Islamic terrorism and Tibetan 
separatism loom over Xinjiang and Tibet. As we enter the Xi Jinping administration after 
2013, we see a level of emphasis of unity over individuality that can only be compared to 
the early 1990s level. I argue that for Xi Jinping administration, the wariness of ethnic 
separatism has taken over the importance of promoting individual ethnic identities. This is 
why we see a corresponding presentation of ethnic policy as a stand-alone and equally 
significant policy area in the 2019 parade.  
Quantitative analysis of party congress reports: 
 
60 Zhang, Xu 张胥. 2015. “Makesi Engesi Minzu Guanxi Lilun Guanxi Lilun yu Hexie Shehui Goujian de 
Neizai Qihe” 马克思恩格斯民族关系理论与和谐社会构建的内在契合 [Internal Coincidence of The 
Construction of A Harmonious Society and Marx and Engels’ s Theory of Ethnic Relations]. Guizhou Minzu 
Yanjiu 贵州民族研究 36 (1): 35–38.  
61 Lu, Cairong 鲁彩荣. 2005. “Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexie Shehui yao Guanzhu Minzu Wenti” 构建社会主义
和谐社会要关注民族问题 [Pay attention to the Ethnic Problem during the Construction of the Socialist 
Harmonious Society]. Neimenggu Daxue Xuebao 内蒙古大学学报 11 (2): 43–46.  
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Figure 28: Trend of Frequency of usage of Ethnic Policy related terms in Party Reports (1954-2019) 
62 
 
 In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to ethnic policy in 
party congress work reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took 
place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in office are 
marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. As we can see, 
with the exception of the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the Communist Party rhetoric 
maintained a generally pro-unity stance on ethnic policy since the beginning of the Reform 
Era (the yellow dots). As expected, we also see a rise in pro-unity stance since the 18th 
Party Congress in 2012. As I have explained during the previous sections on Agriculture 
and Anti-Corruption, we should expect less variation and less volatility in data from Party 
Congress Reports. This relative low level of variation is somewhat reflected in the parades. 
During the 1984, 1999, and 2009 parades, an element of ethnic cultural performance 
remained more or less the same. This consistency meant that although the Chinese 
 
62 Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report. 
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leadership wanted to signal a direction of change, they did not want to set off any 
unnecessary conflict by pushing the direction change too far and too drastically. 
The pro-unity stance of the Party Congress Reports remained relatively consistent 
from the 11th Party Congress to the 16th Congress, which indicates that the official Party 
rhetoric has decided to place a heavier emphasis on unity since the beginning. This heavier 
emphasis shows us that although China’s direction may have changed for ethnic policy, the 
overarching ideological stance has remained largely the same: self-rule but not self-
determination, protection of individual identity but not supremacy of individual identity 
over the national identity.  
Hong Kong and Trade War:  
Ever since the beginning of the Reform Era, the Chinese leadership has been 
employing a strategy called “Hide one’s talent and bide one’s time”（韬光养晦）when 
dealing with the outside world.63 For a very long time, China has been trying to avoid any 
direct confrontation with any outside forces; even when Chinese interests are being 
challenged, the Chinese leadership preferred to seek non-confrontational ways to resolve 
the conflict.64 After Xi Jinping took power, however, it seems that this strategy has been 
changed. During Xi Jinping’s first appearance after being elected the Secretary General of 
the CPC, he used the following phrase in his first speech to the world: “Let China know 
more about the world, and let the world know more about China”.65 Ever since he took 
 
63 Li, Li 李莉. 2006. “Lun Deng Xiaoping ‘Taoguang Yanghui, Yousuo Zuowei’ de Waijiao Zhanlue Sixiang” 
论邓小平‘韬光养晦、有所作为’的外交战略思想 [Discussion of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Hide your strength, Make 
real achievement’ Strategic Diplomatic Doctrine]. Shandong Sheng Qingnian Guanli Ganbu Xueyuan Xuebao
山东省青年管理干部学院学报, no. 1: 18–20.  
64 Zhu, Jiangnan, and Jie Lu. 2013. “One Rising China, Multiple Interpretations: China’s 60th Anniversary 
Celebration through the Lens of the World’s Printed Media.” Journal of Contemporary China 22 (84): 1071.  
65 Xie, Huanchi 谢环驰. 2012. “Xi Jinping deng Shibajie Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Changwei tong 
Zhongwai Jizhe Jianmian” 习近平等十八届中共中央政治局常委同中外记者见面 [Xi Jinping and other 
permanent members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC meets with domestic and foreign 
journalists]. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the United States of America 中华人民共和国驻美
利坚合众国大使馆. November 15. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceus/chn/zt/bada/t989539.htm.  
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office, China has become more and more vocal and proactive on the international stage. 
China is more willing to show its strength and defend its interests openly than ever before.  
Xi Jinping’s administration has been facing two major challenges from the outside 
world among many other challenges. Firstly, China has to face economic attacks from the 
United States in terms of trade tensions and the tariff war; secondly, China has to face 
challenges to its sovereignty by Hong Kong separatists and their foreign supporters. These 
two challenges came at a time during which China is trying to actively increase its 
international influence and presence through its many economic initiatives. As we shall 
see, the 2019 parade was an important opportunity for the Chinese leadership openly and 
clearly demonstrated its strength on these two contentious contemporary issues. 
Qualitative Analysis of the “One Country, Two System” formation（一国两
制方阵）: 
 The imagery of Hong Kong and Macau made their first appearance in the 1999 
parade as a part of the “March with the Motherland” formation. After this first appearance, 
floats dedicated to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are always present alongside floats of 
other Chinese provinces. In 2019, however, in addition to this traditional presence in the 
parades, Hong Kong and Macau were present in another formation earlier on in the parade. 
In the “Reform and Open Up” segment, there is a section dedicated to Jiang Zemin’s 
legacy. Like his predecessors, Jiang Zemin’s legacy was represented by a formation of his 
portrait and two formations representing what the Chinese leadership consider as the most 
important achievements of their administrations.  
 One of the two formations dedicated to Jiang Zemin’s time was the “One Country, 
Two System” formation. This formation was centered around a float that includes images 
of four items. There is a model of the Chinese Redbud flower statue in Hong Kong, a 
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model of the Lotus flower statue in Macau, a model of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, and a 
model of the Basic Law of Macau. The float was surrounded by representatives from Hong 
Kong and Macau. During the 2009 parade, there was not such a formation during Jiang 
Zemin’s section, and there has not been any formations in the past that singled out “One 
Country, Two System” as a stand-alone policy area. Considering for the fact that the Hong 
Kong protests and riots started in March 2019, the timing of the appearance of this 
formation is undoubtedly purposeful. I argue that this formation was clearly created for 
Hong Kong residents as well as the international community.  
 
 
Figure 29: The “One Country, Two System” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
Youtube video, 2:04:26. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s 
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 Firstly, this formation demonstrates the stance that the Chinese government is 
upholding the idea of “One country, two systems” tightly. The models of the two basic 
laws demonstrated a red line for anyone in Hong Kong who wished to challenge the 
authority of the Central Government: The Basic Law of Hong Kong is the political 
boundary which all political activities in Hong Kong have to respect and follow.66 If we 
take a look at the name of this formation, we can also see what the Chinese leadership is 
focusing on here. This formation was named as “One country, two systems” （一国两
制）but not “The return of Hong Kong and Macau” （港澳回归）. This naming strategy 
is not just a literary choice or a result of random selection. I argue that by choosing “One 
country, two system”, the Chinese leadership is not only making a patriotic and emotional 
stance, but also making a legal and systematic stance. As China moves along with its 
reforms on rule of law, its combat strategy against separatism has been increasingly guided 
by legal principles such as the Constitution, the Basic Laws, and the Anti-Secession Law
（反国家分裂法）.  
In a sense, what the parade is trying to present here for Hong Kong is similar to 
what the parade is trying to present for anti-corruption. In both cases, the problem-solving 
strategies seem to have both had a legalist and systematic turn. The difference here 
involves the history of the two problems and the nature of the two problems. To the 
Chinese leadership, corruption is a problem where the only positive aspect would be the 
elimination of the problem itself; for the Hong Kong problem, the Chinese leadership has 
to consider how to create a sense of unity among the majority of Hong Kong residents who 
may not want to participate in the separatist movements. We also have to take into account 
 
66 Hao, Tiechuan 郝铁川. 2017. “Deng Xiaoping ‘Yiguo Liangzhi’ Lilun yu ‘Xianggang Jibenfa’ de Zhiding” 
邓小平‘一国两制’理论与《香港基本法》的制定 [Deng Xiaoping’s ‘One Country, Two System’ theory and 
the Creation of the ‘Basic Law of Hong Kong’]. Jianghan Daxue Xuebao 江汉大学学报, Shehui Kexueban 社
会科学版, 34 (1): 46–53.  
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that Hong Kong has only recently returned to the rightful governance of China, and major 
conflicts only started to arise since Xi Jinping took power in 2012. The problem with 
corruption has a much deeper historical root and is continuous in nature, while the problem 
with Hong Kong is much more of an emergency and an instantaneous problem. I believe 
that this formation in 2019 intends to send out two messages to two different audiences. 
Firstly, it intends to tell Hong Kong separatists that a scenario of Hong Kong independence 
and western-style democratic reform would never take place under the legal regime of the 
Chinese constitution, the Basic Laws, and the Anti-Secession Law. Secondly, it intends to 
tell any foreign sponsor or supporter of the Hong Kong separatist movement that Hong 
Kong will remain as an integral part of the PRC, and that their efforts will only be met with 
more push for unity by the Chinese government. This formation demonstrated once again 
the willingness of the Chinese leadership to directly and publicly address the mine field-
like problem of Hong Kong. 
Qualitative Analysis of the “Master of the Country” formation（当家作主方
阵）: 
 Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the United States and China have engaged in 
numerous political and economic conflicts. China’s increasing economic influence with its 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and its Belt and Road Initiative and China’s 
increasing political influence with its active participation in international organizations 
have been perceived as challenges to American domination of the world. The Trump 
administration has employed the Trade War since 2018 as a strategy to try to stop or at 
least slow down China’s inevitable rise. In this contentious outside environment, the 
Chinese government has been increasingly strong and clear in its response to many of the 













Figure 30: The “Master of the Country” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade 
 
Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central 
Television. 2019. Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui 
Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70周年大会 
阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. 
Youtube video, 1:54:40. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s 
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 We can see this kind of strong response in the “Master of the Country” formation in 
2019. This formation appeared as a part of the “Founding of the Nation” segment. This 
segment was dedicated to Chairman Mao’s legacy. Similar to the “One country, two 
systems” formation, this formation was presented as an example of Chairman Mao’s 
achievements. This formation is centered around a giant float with colorful statues 
depicting the imagery of People’s Representative leaving the People’s Great Hall（人民代
表步出人民大会堂）. This formation is surrounded with marching crowds who are 
dressed in 1950s clothing and holding wide red ribbons in their hands. The most notable 
and unusual feature of this formation is undoubtedly its background music. A song called 
“Socialism is Good” （社会主义好）was playing as the formation marches across 
Tiananmen Square. This song was written by Li Huanzhi and Xi Yang in celebration of the 
completion of the “Anti-Rightist Movement” in 1957. Its lyrics sent a very clear message 
of unite together and fight against an outside enemy. Some of the lyrics are listed below: 
“反动派被打倒、帝国主义夹着尾巴逃跑了” 
Translation: “The reactionaries have been beaten, and the imperialists ran away with their 
tails between their legs” 
“社会主义江山人民保、人民江山坐得牢” 
Translation: “The people will protect the socialist state, and a people’s state is invincible” 
“反动分子想反也反不了” 
Translation: “The reactionaries won’t be able to fight against us even if they wanted to” 
 If we take a closer look at the lyrics, we can understand much better why this song 
and this formation were used to signal to the outside world directly that China is ready to 
take on any challenges. The first lyric mentions two kinds of enemies that China faced and 
is still facing: reactionaries and imperialists. Specific to the situation of contemporary day, 
the term “imperialist” is particularly crucial to the message sent by this formation. I believe 
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it is reasonable to say that the “imperialist” here is highly likely a reference to the United 
States and other countries who are willing to ally with the United States. This lyric presents 
a rather dramatic image of the end result of this trade war, which involves the supposed 
“imperialist” losing and then running away shamefully. This is definitely a very fantastical 
image that could not happen in the real world, but it is nevertheless a powerful one to 
present to both the patriotic domestic audience as well as the hostile foreign audience. 
 The second lyric focuses on the ultimate power source of the Chinese government: 
the Chinese people. This lyric intends to showcase the strength of the Chinese government 
as not only including the strength of its economy or its military, but also including the 
strength of its rather large population. It is common for the Xi Jinping administration to 
invoke the “Chinese people” as a way to demonstrate the fact that the Chinese government 
is not only fighting this trade war as a political institution, but also as a representation of 
the mass populace at home. 
 The third lyric intends to present another fantastical image of the outside threat. I 
believe that the Chinese leadership is trying to use this lyric to demonstrate the fact that the 
“reactionaries”, a term that is inclusive of all kinds of enemies, won’t be able to succeed in 
their attempt to overturn China’s progress no matter how hard they try. Once again, this is 
another way to show strength. The Chinese leadership is basically saying: “We know they 
will come and try to fight us again, but no matter how many times they try that, they won’t 
succeed.” 
This song was very popular in the late 1950s but soon ran into controversy in the 
1960s. Some at the time argued that these lyrics was unreasonably optimistic about China’s 
increasingly difficult economic and political situations, while others argued that this song 
was necessary to promote enthusiasm and encourage optimism during such a difficult 
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time.67 Due to its politically charged lyrics, it was not used in public occasions much 
during the 1980s and 1990s; however, it has made a comeback in recent years, especially 
since the 2010s.68 The comeback of this song, accompanied by China’s increasingly vocal 
stance in defending its own interest, are both signs that China is more and more ready to 
face challenges from the west on its very non-western system of governance and political 
regime.  
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
Discussion of Theoretical Framework 
State propaganda and political performance are both popular subjects for social 
scientists to study. In a country like China whose government and leading party possesses 
an overwhelming power over all of its institutions and citizens, state propaganda and 
political performance have been used extensively since its establishment to achieve various 
political, social, and economic goals. Many scholars have studied these subjects in relation 
not only to China but also to the rest of the world. During my research process, I find that 
many in the academia have focused only on the ideological aspect of state propaganda; 
many of them take a rather cynical view on how and why countries like China use 
propaganda. Most political scientists in the western world will perhaps agree with the idea 
that China’s state propaganda machine is used by the CPC in order to control its citizens, 
to legitimize its rule, to brainwash its people, and to promote a fever of nationalism.  
 
67 Ye, Jiefu 叶介甫. 2018. “Guanyu Gequ ‘Shehuizhuyi Hao’ de Yichang Taolun” 关于歌曲《社会主义好》
的一场讨论 [A Discussion Regarding the Song ‘Socialism Is Good’]. Wenshi Jinghua 文史精华, no. 19: 64–
67.  
68 Meng, Fei 孟菲. 2019. “ ‘Shehuizhuyi Hao’: Gaoge Rehuochaotian Gaojianshe de Hongtu Meijing”《社会主
义好》:高歌热火朝天搞建设的宏图美景 [‘Socialism is Good’: a Grand and Beautiful scene of Loudly 
Singing and Enthusiastically Constructing]. Dangshi Wenhui 党史文汇, no. 4.  
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I, however, being educated and raised in China, have decided to take a different 
approach and viewpoint when I began to design this project. I created this project in 
October of 2019 to try to study China in the following manners. First, I try to study China 
with a practical rather than ideological mindset. I do not see China as a rival of any kind to 
the western world, and I do not stand on the traditional perspective of western democratic 
superiority. Second, I seek to understand China in its own terms. You may have noticed 
that I have been using “CPC” instead of “CCP” when referring to the Communist Party of 
China, and you may also have noticed that words such as “dictatorship”, “nationalism”, 
“authoritarianism”, “repression”, “oppression”, or “autocracy” are either absent or used 
only a few times in this thesis. The reason why you see this deviation from academic 
tradition is because I created my theoretical framework with reference but not dependence 
on existing western literature on state propaganda.  
Most of the existing scholarly work on state propaganda in China or countries alike 
have focused on the ideological-expression functions of propaganda. These existing works 
are valuable in the sense that they have provided me with different kinds of perspectives on 
how and why China uses propaganda. They also helped me in forming my framework by 
identifying what is the general common view that is shared by political scientists. I have 
formed my theoretical framework in opposition to this general common view: I am 
studying the practical policy change-signaling functions of National Day Civilian Parades 
as a form of state propaganda.  
Discussion of Findings 
 My research has produced 3 main pieces of findings. First, there is evidence to 
suggest that major policy direction, focus, and problem-solving strategy changes are reflected 
in the imagery of important policy areas presented in the National Day Civilian Parades. We 
can see from the first three case studies that the imagery of important policy areas in a parade 
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often reflect the general policy stance of that administration. We can also see from the fourth 
case study that the Chinese leadership has been more willing to showcase its stance on a 
contentious issue directly in important public occasions such as the National Day Civilian 
Parade. I have created the following chart to summarize my findings on these four case 
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 These findings have the three main implications. Firstly, it is important to note that 
I did not intend to find any causal relations between policy making and parade imagery. 
My goal was to look to see if there is any evidence to suggest that important policy 
changes are reflected in the parade imageries of these policies. It seems that there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that important policy changes are indeed reflected in a 
limited fashion in the parade imageries.  
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Second, as we have seen in the first three case studies, there are always mismatches 
between policy making and parade imagery. Sometimes, policy changes are not being 
represented in the parades at all. I have tried to find explanations for why these mismatches 
happen. During my analysis process, I employed the principle of “Specific situation 
requires specific analysis” to analyze each piece of evidence of each case study.69 For each 
policy area, I provided my own perspective on why these mismatches existed alongside 
with some historical evidence. It is important to note that it is impossible to know for sure 
how and why each leader made their decision; however, it is possible to provide a 
reasonable explanation based on a careful inference from historical evidence. My 
explanations to these mismatches should be understood as products of my own 
interpretation of this historical evidence; other scholars who will study this subject will 
perhaps have different interpretations based on the same set of evidence. I did not design 
this project as a scientific study; rather, I designed it to be more like a mixture of 
humanities cultural analysis and political science phenomenon analysis. Therefore, even if 
future scholars follow the same procedure, they may end up interpreting the evidence 
differently than me.  
Third, my findings show that the National Day Civilian Parades are very valuable 
to study as a case of political performance and state propaganda in China. My research, I 
believe, has demonstrated that there is a tremendous amount of political symbolism in the 
imageries presented in all the parades, and it would be loss for the academic community if 
these symbols go unstudied. I have demonstrated that it is possible to track the change in 
imageries of some of China’s most important policy areas across time and then compare 
them with the actual policy making process. I have demonstrated that it is possible to go 
 
69 Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. 1968. Mao Dun Lun 矛盾论 [On Contradiction]. In Mao Zedong Xuanji 毛泽东选集
[Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 1st ed., 287. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 北京：人民出版社 Beijing: 
People’s Press.  
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beyond the traditional realm of treating propaganda as simple ideological expression cases; 
hopefully, we will see more studies on this subject matter in the future. 
Limitations and Future scholar work possibilities  
As I have stated previously, I did not design this project as a scientific study in the 
traditional sense of the phrase. Unlike most of my fellow students who formed a 
hypothesis, collected quantitative data, performed regression analysis, and then drew 
conclusion of a correlational nature, I told a story in my thesis. Because my methods and 
my analysis are not strictly scientific, there can be many limitations to the quality of links I 
found between parade imagery and policy changes. 
For my data collection on important policy related terms, there is a lot of room for 
improvement and possibly rectification. If allotted more time and resources, I can 
potentially conduct a more thorough word search in these reports or even perform a similar 
kind of research on other types of government documents. Future projects can look into the 
possibility of searching for the number of laws and regulations made per year for each of 
these policy areas. Future projects can also perform a qualitative analysis of leaders’ 
speeches in regard to these policy areas. This project’s quantitative data collection is an 
imperfect and subject process, but it is reasonably sufficient enough considering the 
qualitative nature of this project’s central argument. 
Another limitation is regarding the qualitative data of the parades. Due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, I was not able to return to China in summer 2020 to interview 
people who participated in these parades. Unlike Chang Tai-hung who utilized interviews 
of parade participants in his analysis, I could not do so. This severely limited the scope of 
my research. The only resource I can find are primary video evidence and secondary 
scholarly source. Future scholars can consider doing a cross-time tracking program for 
these parades that usually take place every ten years. In a normal parade year, scholars can 
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potentially do a field study of these parades in China to gather data on public reaction and 
parade organization. 
One more limitation would be the entire research design. As stated previously, I 
wanted to create a project that is different from the conventional political science model of 
research. I wanted to create a project that brings in aspects of humanities research and 
popular science. This project’s research design is a way for me to experiment with the 
possibility of moving away from the usage of heavy quantitative analysis, and it has 
proven to be a worthwhile experiment. Due to the fact that this is an unconventional 
research design, there are many parts of the design that I wish I could change. It is 
important to note that I only was able to solidify my “Four Signaling Functions of State 
Propaganda” framework less than a month before the final due date of this thesis. If given 
more time and more resource, I would be able to design this research in a much more 
sophisticated fashion. Future scholars should see this project as a pioneer project in its 
nature. Future scholars should continue this experiment of trying to design political science 
research that would bring in elements from other disciplines. I believe it is worthwhile for 
future scholars to consider more interdisciplinary research between political science and 
the humanities.  
Final Thoughts  
The first conception for this thesis was born during a dark night in October 2019, 
and the final words of this thesis were written during a dark night in March 2021. The 
beginning of this thesis coincided with the height of the US-China trade war, and the end 
of this thesis coincided with terrible attacks on Asian American communities across the 
United States. The whole process of designing and writing this thesis was accompanied by 
constant turbulence in the world outside my fifth-floor apartment. Back in 2019, my 
mental health issues were only beginning to manifest themselves; in 2021, my mental 
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health issues have become an every-day nightmare for me that I just can’t escape. In early 
2020, I was worried sick for my friends and family in China due to the newly emerged 
coronavirus; in 2021, I am worried sick myself and friends here in the United States due to 
the still-ravaging COVID-19. During these 2 years, I have had several mental breakdowns, 
suicide attempts, and moments of pure despair. The Youtube videos of these parades used 
to be simple empirical evidence for my research; now they are the only few things left in 
my life that can cheer me up. I have watched these parades thousands of times, and I often 
put on my headphones and imagine myself being one of those parade marchers, marching 
across the Tiananmen Square under those bright October days. 
Many times, during these 2 years, I was discouraged from doing a project my way. 
I got push back for my ideas and I didn’t know what to do with this goldmine of political 
symbolism. Gladly, through help of my two advisors and my good friends, I managed to 
keep pushing forward without losing my original intentions. I managed to reach March 
2021 with a thesis that I think is at least readable. I hope I have presented my readers with 
a different perspective on Chinese politics. I hope I have shown people that it is possible to 
study China without having an ideological bias. I hope that I have presented a more 
reasonable image of China to the American people during a time when China is hated by 
both the American government and the American society for various of political and 
economic reasons.  
May our two countries finally find peace someday. May we see cooperation instead 
of conflict. May we see understanding instead of accusations. May we see mutual respect 
rather than mutual destruction.  
See you during the 2029 National Day Civilian Parade. 


















 During my research process, I have collected 2 types of data. The first type involves 
qualitative data on the 4 parades (1984, 1999, 2009, 2019). This type of data is collected 
through a process of viewing video footage of the parades and taking notes during the 
viewership. Here is a list of video footages with links: 
National Day Civilian Parade in 2019: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&vl=zh-Hans 
National Day Civilian Parade in 2009: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos 
National Day Civilian Parade in 1999: 
https://www.bilibili.com/video/av71455376/ 
 National Day Civilian Parade in 1984: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8 
 
 The second type of data involves quantitative data on the frequency of usage of 
various important political terms within China’s annual government work reports and the 
CPC’s quinquennial party congress political reports. This type of data is collected through 
a process of word search within these reports. Here are examples of what citation would 
look like for these reports: 
 
Li, Keqiang. 2020. “REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE GOVERNMENT.” Government 
Work Report. Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China.  
 
Xi, Jinping. 2017. “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous 
Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era.” Party Congress Political Report. Beijing: Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China.  
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Since there are 11 party congresses and more than 50 government work reports, I 
have decided to not cite all of them in the reference. All of them will have citations that are 
similar to the two examples above. 
Data Format and Code Book 
In the dataset which I will send alongside this assignment, you will see 6 separate 
sheets of data. In this section, I will be explaining the format of these data, my reasoning 
for using these formats, and my coding strategy. For the purpose of making a draft, I will 
be listing this information; I will be reformatting this information according to appropriate 
academic styles. 
Section: Parade Formation Data 
Data time range: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019. 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 2 
Variable: Year 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure time. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: This format has been selected as year is a time variable 
which is naturally quantitative. 
Coding: Data for this variable will be listed chronologically from 1954 to 2019. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 3 
Variable: Total Formation 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of formations 
present within a parade. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of formations present 
within a parade will help us to see the length of a parade. 
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of formations present 
within each of the 4 parades. A list of formations can be found in each of the 4 
sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 4 
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Variable: People-Tribute Formation (PTF) 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of formations 
present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of formations present 
within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us 
to see how much of a parade is about paying tribute to the populace. 
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of formations present 
within each of the 4 parades that pays tribute to the people. Determining if a 
formation is paying tribute to the people is a subjective process. Generally, 
formations that represent social groups such as veterans, workers, formers, and 
minorities can be considered as “PTF”; formations that present topics such as 
democracy and early socialist industrialization can also be considered as “PTF”. 
Relevant topics and social groups represented during the parades can be found 
in column C of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative 
information on the parades. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 5 
Variable: First appearance of PTF 
Variable usage: This variable is used to indicate the order of appearance of the 
first formation that is dedicated to the people within a parade. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Indicating the order of appearance of the first formation 
that is dedicated to the people within a parade can help us see the relative 
position of a PTF within a parade and to see the level of priority that the 
populace has been given by the leadership (more early=more important). 
Coding: This data is collected by looking for the first PTF within each of the 
four parades and noting their order of appearance. This information can be 
found in column A of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative 
information on the parades. All PTFs and qualitative information regarding the 
PTFs will be written in white colored text.  
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 6 
Variable: Leader-Tribute Formation (LTF) 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of formations 
present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party 
leaderships. 
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Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of formations present 
within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party leaderships 
will help us to see how much of a parade is about paying tribute to the 
leaders/party. 
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of formations present 
within each of the 4 parades that pays tribute to previous and current leaders. 
Determining if a formation is paying tribute to the leadership is a subjective 
process. Generally, formations that present the portrait or statue of previous or 
current leaders can be considered as “LTF”; for the sake of simplicity and 
convenience of analysis, formations that are not “PTF” can be considered 
generally as “LTF”. Information on whether or not leadership images are 
present in a formation can be found in column A of each of the 4 sheets 
dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 7 
Variable: LTF Proportion 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of formations 
present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party 
leaderships.  
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of formations present within 
a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party leaderships will 
help us to see the relative level of emphasis of leadership’s imagery within a 
parade. 
Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the number of LTF within a parade 
by the total number of formations within a parade. This proportion is generally 
rounded to the second decimal point. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 8 
Variable: People-Tribute Music (PTM) 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of 
background songs present during a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the 
Chinese people. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of background songs 
during a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us 
 106 
to see how much of a parade is about paying tribute to the people. This variable 
can be seen as a complimentary variable with the number of PTF. 
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of background songs 
present during each of the 4 parades that pays tribute to the Chinese people. 
Determining if a background song is paying tribute to the populace is a 
subjective process. Generally, there are several well-known songs in China that 
are commonly known to be about people’s life or about paying tribute to a 
major social group within the common populace. Examples of such songs 
include “On the Hopeful Fields”, “Us the Workers have Power”, and 
“Mountains and Rivers”. Names of songs in the order of their appearance 
during the parade can be found in column E of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to 
collecting qualitative information on the parades. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 9 
Variable: Total Music 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of 
background songs present during a parade. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of background songs 
during a parade will help us to see the general level of musical variation within 
the parade (more songs=more variations). This variable can be seen as a 
complimentary variable with the total number of formations. 
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of background songs 
present during each of the 4 parades. Names of songs present can be found 
column E of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information 
on the parades. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 10 
Variable: Total Interaction Score 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the general level of interaction 
between the leadership and the marching populace during a parade. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: By summing all of the individual formations’ 
interaction scores, we can see the how much interaction there was during the 
parade.  
Coding: This data is calculated by making a summation of all of the individual 
formations’ interaction scores. A higher total interaction score would indicate 
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more interactions during a parade, while a lower total interaction score would 
indicate less interactions during a parade.  
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 11 
Variable: PTM Proportion 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of background 
songs present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people.  
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of background songs present 
within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us 
to see the relative level of emphasis of the populace’s imagery within a parade. 
Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the number of PTM within a parade 
by the total number of background songs within a parade. This proportion is 
generally rounded to the second decimal point. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 12 
Variable: PTF Proportion 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of formations 
present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people.  
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of formations present within 
a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us to see 
the relative level of emphasis of the populace’s imagery within a parade. 
Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the number of PTF within a parade 
by the total number of formations within a parade. This proportion is generally 
rounded to the second decimal point. 
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 13 
Variable: Interaction Proportion 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of formations 
present within a parade that had signs of interactions between the populace and 
the leadership.  
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Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of formations present within 
a parade that had signs of interactions between the populace and the leadership 
can help us see the relative level of willing of the leadership to show a closer 
relationship with their people.  
Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the total interaction score by the 
total number of formations. This calculation strategy was used because during 
parade where there was full interaction during every single formation, we would 
see total interaction score=total number of formations. This proportion is 
generally rounded to the second decimal point.  
 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 14 
Variable: Mass-Line Index  
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the general level of Mass-Line 
sentiment during the parades. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Calculating a mass-line index can help us see how 
much of the parades’ content and outlook are in-line with one of the CPC’s 
most important ideologies: The Mass-Line Principle.  
Coding: This data is calculated by summing up 3 variables: PTM proportion, 
PTF proportion, and Interaction Proportion. All of these proportions are 
indicators of how much of these parades’ content and outlooks are being 
designed to pay tribute to the populace. After calculating a summation, these 
summations will be turned into a number value by removing the percentage sign 
while preserving the decimal point.  
 
Section: Political Term Usage in Government Work Reports 
Data time range: 1954-1960, 1964, 1975, 1978-2019. 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 19-37 
Variables: Important political and policy terms used in government work 
reports 
Mass 群众 













Rural/Three Agricultural Policy 乡村/三农 









Rule of Law 法治/依法/宪法/法制 
Ethnic Unity 团结/共同体/民族问题/交流/交融/和睦/和衷/统一/中华民
族大家庭 
Ethnic Laissez Faire 民族区域自治/差别化/少数民族文化 
Nation 少数民族/民族政策/民族 
Ethnic Policy=Ethnic Unity - Ethnic Laissez Faire 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the frequency of usage of 
important political and policy terms in government work reports.  
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Counting the frequency of usage of important political 
and policy terms in government work reports helps us to see the general level of 
emphasis of these political principles and policies within each year’s report of 
government work. 
Coding: This data is collected by doing a word search of each of these terms or 
set of terms within the full text of each year’s government work report and 
recording the numbers of times that these terms show up within the reports.  
 
Section: Political Term Usage in Party Reports 
Data time range: 1956, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017 
Sheet name: Quantification 
Data location: Row 42-60 
















Rural/Three Agricultural Policy 乡村/三农 









Rule of Law 法治/依法/宪法/法制 
Ethnic Unity 团结/共同体/民族问题/交流/交融/和睦/和衷/统一/中华民
族大家庭 
Ethnic Laissez Faire 民族区域自治/差别化/少数民族文化 
Nation 少数民族/民族政策/民族 
Ethnic Policy=Ethnic Unity - Ethnic Laissez Faire 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the frequency of usage of 
important political and policy terms in communist party congress reports.  
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Counting the frequency of usage of important political 
and policy terms in party reports helps us to see the general level of emphasis of 
these political principles and policies within every five year’s report of 
communist party congress. 
Coding: This data is collected by doing a word search of each of these terms or 
set of terms within the full text of each party congress report and recording the 
numbers of times that these terms show up within the reports.  
 
Section: Parade Qualitative Information 
Data time range: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019 
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Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019 
Data location: Column A 
Variable: Formations 
Variable usage: This variable is used to catalog the names of each of the many 
formations present during the parades. 
Data format: Qualitative 
Reason for data format: Making a list of all the names of formations can help us 
see clearly what each formation is generally about. They can help us indicate 
the topic, social group, or important policy that these formations are trying to 
represent. 
Coding: For the 2009 and 2019 parades, there are officially designated 
formation names. These official formation names can be found within the 
background commentary made by the CCTV during live reporting of the two 
parades. For the 1984 and 1999 parades, some formations have officially 
designated formation names, while others do not have officially designated 
formation names as the two parades are not organized strictly according to 
separated formations. Names for formations of these two parades are collected 
by both using names designated to these formations by the CCTV commentary 
as well as by making an observation of the formations and designated names for 
them based on the imagery presented on the floats. 
 
Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019 
Data location: Column B 
Variable: Notes 
Variable usage: This is a list of notes I have taken in order to note the 
consistencies and changes made to various formations within the parades. 
Data format: Qualitative 
Reason for data format: Taking notes on the qualitative changes made to the 
formations will help us to compare formations from different parades as well as 
the different changes made to the same formation across different parades.  
Coding: Notetaking while viewing the video recordings of these parades is a 
subjective process. Here are some important elements that are usually present in 
the notes:  
1: What is this formation supposed to be depicting with its imagery? 
2: Have we seen this formation before in previous parades? 
3: What did this formation look like before, and how is it different in the present 
parade comparing to the past? 
4: Is there anything special to be noted about this formation? Are there any 
changes that seem to be unusual and odd? 
5: For some formations that are particularly interesting, I will offer a few 
sentences of subjective interpretation of why a change has been made. 
 112 
 
Example of a note’s coding: (Please refer to Sheet 2019, Row 5 and 6, 
Formation: “Our Blood in War”) 
 
What is this formation supposed to be depicting with its imagery? 
Answer: “Reminding people of their glorious warring past by having two 
formations dedicated to veterans and history of revolution.” 
 
Have we seen this formation before in previous parades? 
Answer: “Yes we have. This formation was present during the 2009 parade.” 
 
What did this formation look like before, and how is it different in the present 
parade comparing to the past? 
Answer: “In 2009, there was only one formation dedicated to the veterans; this 
formation was inherited in style in 2019, but an addition formation was added in 
2019. This additional formation includes more than a dozen buses full of 
veterans and retired national heroes.” 
 
Is there anything special to be noted about this formation? Are there any 
changes that seem to be unusual and odd? 
Answer: “This is the first time when buses are used in the parades are a type of 
float.” 
 
For some formations that are particularly interesting, I will offer a few 
sentences of subjective interpretation of why a change has been made. 
Interpretation: “With increasing tension between China and the United States, 
Xi Jinping is not shying away from symbols of past victories over outside 
enemies. The 2019 parade definitely wishes to emphasize 
the pride in one's warring past.” 
 
 
Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019 
Data location: Column C 
Variable: Theme 
Variable usage: This is a list of themes I have designated to each and every one 
of the formations. 
Data format: Qualitative 
Reason for data format: Designating a short one phrase theme to a formation 
can help us understand the topic of the formation without having to read 
through a lengthy description.  
Coding: Determining which theme each formation is trying to present is a 
subjective process. The theme of each formation is determined by taking into 
consideration of the following elements: which social group is this formation 
trying to represent? Which national policy is this formation trying to represent?  
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For example: Please refer to Sheet 2009, Row 9 and 34. 
 
(Row 9) Formation Name: “Story of the Spring”. 
Theme: Leadership 
Reason for designation: This formation centers around a giant oil painting 
portrait of Deng Xiaoping, who is the leader of China from 1978 to 1989. Due 
to the fact that his imagery is the dominant and the only image present in this 
formation, and due to the fact that the background music played during this 
formation’s march is also a song tributing to his term in office, one can 
reasonably designate “Leadership” as the theme of this formation.  
 
Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019 
Data location: Column D 
Variable: Interaction Score 
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure whether or not there is 
populace-leadership interaction present while a formation is marching past 
Tiananmen. 
Data format: Quantitative 
Reason for data format: Using a 0-1 scale to indicate the existence of populace-
leadership interaction helps us to understand the level of relationship between 
China’s leadership and the Chinese people that the leadership is willing to show 
in public (more interaction=more willing to show a closer relationship). 
Coding: This data is collected by assigning every formation a 0, 0.5, or 1 score. 
A 0 score represents no interaction. A 0.5 score represents partial interaction. A 
1 score represents full interaction. Determination of interaction scores is a 
subjective process. This process involves watching the parades and make 
observations to see if there are any signs of interaction during the march of a 
formation. Signs of interaction include eye contact, cheering, hand waving, and 
direction of body turn. A 0 score would mean that there is no sign of any direct 
eye contact between the populace and the leadership, and/or that there is no sign 
of the marching populace turning towards the leadership and cheering. A 0.5 
score would mean that these signs are only present with people standing on the 
floats within each formation. A 1 score would mean that these signs are present 
both on the floats and in the marching populace within a formation. Every 
formation’s interaction score can be found in column D of each of the 4 sheets 
dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades. 
 
Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019 
Data location: Column E 
Variable: Songs 
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Variable usage: This variable is used to catalogue that different background 
songs used during the parade.  
Data format: Qualitative 
Reason for data format: Noting the name of the songs can help us understand 
the general political tone of the parades as most of the songs used in these 
parades were written with a political purpose in mind. Most of these songs are 
commonly known as “Red Songs”, which means that were written alongside 
communist party guidelines or ideologies. 
Coding: The cataloguing of these songs is done by listening to the background 
music while viewing the video recordings of the parades. Since most of these 
songs are widely known in the Chinese public, it is a subjective but simple 
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